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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE ORGAN SHORTAGE
ON JUNE 14, 1993, sixty-one-year-old Robert Casey, gover-
nor of Pennsylvania, underwent a rare1 heart-liver transplant
at Presbyterian Hospital in Pittsburgh. While the operation
went extremely well and the governor returned to the gover-
nor's mansion to finish his term,3 much of the nation's attention
focused not on the details of the operation and the governor's
prognosis, but on the circumstances surrounding his receipt of
the organs. In many ways, the governor was a very lucky man.
At the time of his operation, the average wait for a new heart
was 198 days; for a new liver, sixty-seven days.' Thousands
were dying each year before an organ became available.5 The
governor himself had only days to live. Fortunately for him, he
beat the odds and received his organs after waiting for only one
day.
While Governor Casey was awarded his organs in full
compliance with existing policies on organ procurement and al-
location,6 his case raises two broad questions. First, why is
1. Governor Casey was only the seventh person to receive such a transplant, and at
61 years of age, among the oldest. Don Colburn, Gov. Casey's Quick Double Transplant;
How Did He Jump to the Top of the Waiting List?, WASH. POST, June 22, 1993, at Z8.
2. The operation was necessary because the governor's heart and liver had been de-
stroyed by a rare disease called familial amyloidosis. Lisa Belkin, Fairness Debated in
Quick Transplant, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1993, at A16.
3. Casey's doctor has predicted that Casey will live at least another 10 years. See
Russell E. Eshleman, Jr., A Year After Transplant Surgery, Casey is Going Strong, PHIL-
ADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 7, 1994, at Al. The governor still experiences minor setbacks,
such as rejection episodes, but they have been controlled so far by changes in medication.
Id. Casey finished his second term as governor in January, 1995. In March 1995, he an-
nounced his intention to run against President Clinton in the 1996 presidential primaries.
He withdrew from the race only one month later, however, citing concerns about whether
he had the stamina to run a two-year race. See Catherine Manegold, After 4 Weeks, Ex
Governor Ends '96 Challenge to Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1995, at B12.
4. Colburn, supra note 1.
5. In 1993, 2889 people died on the waiting list. UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN
SHARING, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT RE-
CIPIENTS AND THE ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, app. at H-2
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 ANNUAL REPORT].
6. Available hearts and livers are generally given to people who are medically eligi-
ble (having a compatible size and blood type), who are closest to death, and who have been
waiting the longest to receive an organ. See 1993 UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHAR-
ING, UNOS POLICIES, at 3-15 to 3-22 (as of June 30, 1993) [hereinafter UNOS POLICIES].
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there such a severe shortage of organs available for transplan-
tation, and what, if anything, could or should be done about it?
Second, assuming the continued existence of an organ shortage,
how is it that those organs which are available should be allo-
cated? This Article will explore these issues in some detail.
The first successful solid organ" transplant was performed
in 1954, a kidney transplant between identical twins." By the
late 1960s, kidney transplants had become a standard therapy
for treating kidney failure." Problems with organ rejection,'0
Lacking any national guidance, however, on combined heart-liver transplants, the local or-
gan procurement agency in Pittsburgh had adopted a policy of giving priority to those
awaiting a combined heart-liver transplant over those needing a heart or a liver alone.
Colburn, supra note 1. Governor Casey happened to be the only person on the list for the
two organs, so when a combined heart and liver became available from the same donor, he
got them. Id. The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), the nonprofit organization
under contract to the United States Department of Health and Human Services for na-
tional transplantation policy coordination, has since adopted a new policy requiring that
patients waiting for heart-liver transplants be placed on the individual lists for each organ.
When they become eligible to receive an organ on one list, they will then be offered the
second organ from the same donor. See Karen Pallarito, Pennsylvania Governor's Trans-
plant Prompts Change in Policy, MOD. HEALTHCARE, July 12, 1993, at 18. Local trans-
plant organizations must follow UNOS policies to remain eligible for Medicare and Medi-
caid reimbursement by the federal government. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8(a)(1)(B)
(1988). Elsewhere in this Article, I argue that Governor Casey should not have received his
organ transplants, but for different reasons.
7. "Solid organ" means kidney, heart, liver, lung, pancreas, or any of the digestive
organs. In subsequent references, the phrases "solid organ" and "organ" are used inter-
changeably. This Article will not focus, for the most part, on transplants of renewable body
products, like blood and bone marrow, which generally come from living donors, and on
other body tissues, such as corneas, bones, and skin, which, while not renewable, are gener-
ally not needed to save lives but to improve quality of life. Transplantation of solid organs
is worthy of separate attention because it raises more troublesome ethical issues. First, as
currently practiced, someone usually has to die before these solid organs become available
for transplant. Second, if the organs are not made available, the patient who needs the
organ usually dies. These two facts combine to create extraordinary pressures to find new
and more productive donor sources.
8. See John P. Merrill et al., Successful Homotransplantation of the Human Kid-
ney Between Identical Twins, 160 JAMA 277, 277 (1956) (discussing the process involved
with transplanting a kidney, which had not been performed up to that date).
9. See John Lantos & Mark Siegler, Re-evaluating Donor Criteria: Live Donors, in
THE SURGEON GENERAL'S WORKSHOP ON INCREASING ORGAN DONATION: BACKGROUND
PAPERS 271, 272 (1991). By 1978, more than 40,000 kidney transplants had been per-
formed worldwide. See RUSSELL SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 19 (1981).
10. Rejection is the phenomenon whereby the immune system of the organ recipient
recognizes the transplanted tissue as foreign and seeks to destroy it. Much the same process
is at work when the body seeks out and destroys foreign bacteria or viruses which threaten
the health of the body. The severity of the rejection phenomenon can be reduced if organs
are transplanted between donors and recipients whose HLA antigens (the proteins on cell
surfaces which control the rejection process) are similar. For an in-depth discussion of the
rejection process and its management, see Charles Chandler & Edward Passaro, Jr.,
Transplant Rejection: Mechanisms and Treatment, 128 ARCHIVES SURGERY 279 (1993).
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however, prevented significant numbers of transplants for other
organs from occurring until 1983, when the anti-rejection drug
cyclosporine was approved for general use.1 From that point
on, the number of solid organ transplants performed each year
in this country mushroomed, exceeding 18,000 by 1994.12
Unfortunately, there is an upper limit on the number of
organs currently available for transplantation.' 3 Most organs
are taken only after the donor's death, 4 and only certain of the
deceased are appropriate donors. Most donors are individuals
whose brains have died but whose heartbeat and respiration are
artificially maintained by mechanical ventilators. According to
legal definition,' 5 these individuals are dead, so their organs
can be removed without fear of criminal prosecution based on a
claim that the organ removals caused the patient's death. The
artificial maintenance of respiration and circulation allows the
organs to remain healthy and fully oxygenated until the mo-
ment they must be removed from the donor's body for trans-
plantation.' Organs have been obtained from an average of ap-
11. See Peter Gorner, Wonderworker: Despite Rejection, He Pursued an Odd White
Mold that Brought Transplant Surgery Back to Life, Cm. TRIB., Dec. 28, 1988, at CI
(discussing the use of cyclosporine).
12. United Network for Organ Sharing, Facts About Transplantation in the United
States, May 4, 1995 [hereinafter UNOS 1995 Facts] (available from UNOS, P.O. Box
13770, Richmond, VA 23225-8770).
13. This same limitation is not true for some tissue transplantations, like bone mar-
row and blood, where the potential exists to meet the needs of all for donated material. The
reason is that people can donate these kinds of tissue while they are still alive without
incurring substantial long-term risk to their health. See Mark F. Anderson, Encouraging
Bone Marrow Transplants from Unrelated Donors: Some Proposed Solution to a Pressing
Social Problem, 54 U. Pirr. L. REV. 477, 478-79 (1993).
14. There are exceptions. Living donations of kidneys are possible and fairly com-
mon. Partial liver and lung donations also can be made by living donors under certain
circumstances. For more on these issues, see text at notes 106-56 infra.
15. A majority of states have adopted the Uniform Determination of Death Act that
states: "An individual who has sustained ... irreversible cessation of all functions of the
entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead." UHiF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1,
12 U.L.A. 386 (1980).
16. Before organs are actually removed, physicians circulate a cold preservative solu-
tion throughout the donor's body to begin the process of preparing the organs for removal.
As soon as the organs are removed, they are placed in a preservative solution at a tempera-
ture only a few degrees above freezing. See Anthony M. D'Alessandro et al., Current Sta-
tus of Organ Preservation with University of Wisconsin Solution, 115 ARCHIVES PATHOL-
OGY LABORATORY MED. 306-307 (1991). The standard practice is to transplant hearts and
lungs within four hours of removal, livers within 16 hours, and kidneys within 48 to 72
hours. See United Network for Organ Sharing, UNOS Statement of Principles and Objec-
tives of Equitable Organ Distribution 28-29, 32-33 (1994). Waiting any longer usually
means the transplant will fail.
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proximately 4500 such donors in each of the last four years.17
For recipients of these donated organs, short-term prognosis is
reasonably good. The one-year success rate for both kidney and
heart transplants now exceeds 80% and for liver transplants is
more than 70% .1
Unfortunately, there are many more candidates for organ
transplantation than there are donors. As of May 4, 1995,
39,845 people were waiting for new organs,19 a figure that has
continued to grow for as long as records have been kept. The
sense of urgency for these patients depends on the type of or-
gan they need. About 75 % of these patients are waiting for a
new kidney. Until a replacement kidney is found, artificial kid-
ney machines, using a process known as dialysis, can keep most
of them alive for a number of years, albeit with a less desirable
quality of life.20 Persons in need of other solid organ trans-
17. Roger W. Evans, Organ Procurement Expenditures and the Role of Financial
Incentives, 269 JAMA 3112, 3113 (1993) (providing data on organ donor supply in the
United States from 1990 to 1992); Amanda Husted, Health Watch, ATLANTA CONST., Jan.
12, 1994, at B4 (showing a slight increase for 1993 to 4824 donors).
18. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, app. at E-7. These figures are based on
1992 data, the latest year for which national numbers are available. If historical trends
have continued, success rates should be even higher today. The one-year patient survival
rates are even better than the organ survival rates. In the case of kidneys, when a trans-
plant fails, the patient can return to dialysis. See infra text accompanying note 111. In the
case of liver or heart transplants, if an organ fails, retransplants are sometimes done. See
infra note 194.
Unfortunately, long-term organ survival has not kept pace with short-term results. The
typical transplanted organ lasts about seven years, a percentage that has not changed much
over time. Apparently, the only way to improve long-term success significantly is to ensure
a close tissue match between donor and recipient. See Paul I. Terasaki, Histocompatability
Testing in Transplantation, 115 ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 250 (1991).
19. UNOS 1995 Facts, supra note 12.
20. Artificial kidney machines do not perform as well as a real kidney, so patients
often feel tired and anemic. The machines also require the patient to come for treatment
two or three times a week for four to six hours per visit. Many patients on dialysis are
unable to stay employed and must go on disability. For a description of some of the
problems facing patients on dialysis, see ROGER GABRIEL, A PATIENT'S GUIDE TO DIALYSIS
AND TRANSPLANTATION 71-76 (3d. ed. 1987). In recent years, the drug recombinant
human erythropoietin has alleviated some of the anemia-related problems for dialysis pa-
tients. See Roger W. Evans et al., The Quality of Life of Hemodialysis Recipients Treated
with Recombinant Human Erythropoietin, 263 JAMA 825 (1990). Even when using the
drug, however, many dialysis patients still experience pain (57 %), fatigue (58 %), and con-
tinued unemployment (only 23 % are able to hold a job, the same percentage as before use
of the drug). Id. at 828. Kidney transplants, therefore, still offer a better quality of life.
Most kidney recipients return to their normal life patterns following a successful trans-
plant. See Ralph E. Tarter et al., Quality of Life Before and After Orthotopic Hepatic
Transplantation, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1521 nn. 4-8 (1991). For some patients,
dialysis is no longer an option. For them, the choice is either a new kidney or death. In
1993, for example, 1277 people died awaiting a kidney transplant. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT,
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plants are not so lucky. For those with end-stage liver,21
heart,2 12 or lung disease, organ transplantation is the only alter-
native to an early death .2  And for at least one-third of these
patients, death comes before a new organ.2 '
Watching a patient die when there is no cure for her dis-
ease is difficult enough. It becomes even more difficult when a
supra note 5, app. at H-9. The long-term survival for dialysis patients who receive trans-
plants is significantly better than for those who remain on dialysis. See Friedrich K. Port et
al., Comparison of Survival Probabilities for Dialysis Patients vs. Cadaveric Renal Trans-
plant Recipients, 270 JAMA 1339, 1340 (1993).
21. Medical researchers are working on creating an artificial liver. Their task is
made more difficult by the complexity of the liver's function. It is a biological laboratory,
simultaneously removing toxins, manufacturing enzymes, and storing food energy. The only
way to replicate its functions is to build a device which uses liver cells from animals or
human beings to perform the necessary chemical magic. Current devices undergoing test-
ing will probably suffice to buy extra time for transplant patients as they wait for an organ
to become available. There is, of course, no guarantee that a new liver will become availa-
ble even if the patient is able to wait a few extra months. Scientists also hope that the new
devices will allow the livers in some patients to mend while the machine takes over some of
the liver function. See Marilyn Dunlop, Artificial Livers Being Developed, TORONTO STAR,
Nov. 27, 1993, at K2.
22. Scientists have been working on developing an artificial heart for many years. In
1982, the first artificial heart intended as a permanent replacement was implanted in Dr.
Barney Clark. He lived for 112 days. The device, known as the Jarvik heart named after its
inventor, was subsequently implanted in four other patients, one of whom lived 620 days.
The heart created serious quality of life problems for the patients. It was connected by six-
foot tubes to a refrigerator-sized air compressor outside the patient's body. The tubes
caused repeated infections. Blood clots generated by the heart caused a number of strokes.
For a history of the project, see William C. DeVries, The Permanent Artificial Heart: Four
Case Reports, 259 JAMA 849 (1988) (describing the clinical courses of four patients who
received the Jarvik artificial heart). The Jarvik heart also was used as a temporary bridge
for about 150 patients who were awaiting transplants. Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. Halts the
Use of Jarvik Heart, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 12, 1990, at A20. Because of manufacturing de-
fects, the Food and Drug Administration withdrew its approval for the heart's use in 1990.
Id. Other temporary heart replacements, both total and partial (the ventricular-assist de-
vice) continue to be used for patients on transplant waiting lists. See Kathy McCabe, To
Mend a Broken Heart, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 1994, at 80. Work also continues on
building a totally implantable replacement heart (with its own internal power source) aided
by grants from the federal government. The year 2000 is the current goal for a workable
device. Id.
23. Those awaiting a pancreas transplant share a fate more akin to that of those
looking for a new kidney. Pancreatic transplants are done to cure diabetes. Until a replace-
ment pancreas is found, patients can usually be maintained by supplemental insulin injec-
tions. Accordingly, while there were 771 pancreas transplants performed in 1993, only 3
patients died while waiting for one. See 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, app. at D-18,
H-9. A transplant is superior to insulin injections because it produces a better quality of
life for the patient and because it can reduce the incidence of diabetic complications, such
as kidney disease. See Paul R. Robertson, Seminars in Medicine of the Beth Israel Hospi-
tal, Bostoi" Pancreatic and Islet Transplantation for Diabetes-Cures or Curiosities, 327
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1861 (1992).
24. Stuart J. Youngner et al., Ethical, Psychosocial and Public Policy Implications
of Procuring Organs from Non-Heart-Beating Cadaver Organs, 269 JAMA 2769 (1993).
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cure has been developed but the patient still dies because there
is a shortage of the curative agent. As organ supply has failed
to keep pace with organ demand,2 5 pressure has grown to find
new sources of organs. A number of proposals have been made
to obtain more solid organ donors. They divide into two major
categories - those intended to increase donations from the liv-
ing and those intended to increase donations from the dead.26
After examining many of these proposals, this Article con-
cludes that the primary emphasis should be placed on increas-
ing donations from living donors. Such a course would maxi-
mize the overall number of lives saved while simultaneously
reducing the unsavory reliance on increasingly ghoulish tech-
25. Altruism may not be the only thing motivating those who seek to increase the
supply of transplantable organs. The number of organ transplant centers in recent years
has ballooned. Just as hospitals compete to offer the latest high-tech diagnostic machinery,
so they compete to offer the latest in transplant technology. But these transplant centers
need to be supported financially. And the only way to make them pay their way is to have
more transplants. While there were 164 heart transplant programs in the country in 1993,
they performed only 2298 heart transplants that year, an average of only 14 transplants for
each program. See United Network for Organ Sharing, Facts About Transplantation in
the United States, Apr. 20, 1994. Fierce competition exists among transplant programs for
those organs that are available. In 1994, for example, two western Massachusetts hospitals
left an organ-sharing organization based in Boston for one based in Hartford, Connecticut
so that they could keep more of the kidneys coming from donors in their area for their own
patients. See Richard Saltus, Two Mass. Medical Centers Pull Out of N.E. Organ Bank,
BosToN GLOBE, July 14, 1994, at 1 (Metro). Fewer transplant centers with more proce-
dures being performed at each center would produce better results at a lower cost.
26. This Article will not address "high-tech" fixes for the transplantation problem
which may become available in the future. Two in particular show promise - transplants
from animals (known as xenografts) and artificial (mechanical) replacements. Xenografts
have been tried on several occasions in recent years but with uniformly poor results. Be-
cause the tissue differences between animal and human are so great, they generate a rejec-
tion response, known as the "complement reaction," that is far more powerful than the
normal rejection response which results from human-to-human transplants. The comple-
ment reaction cannot be controlled by ordinary anti-rejection drugs. However, scientists are
now developing genetically altered pigs whose organs will contain human proteins on their
cell surfaces. With these human proteins, the pig organs will be able to fool human im-
mune systems into thinking that the organs are human. If that can be accomplished, rejec-
tion problems will be no more difficult than with regular human-to-human transplants and
will be controllable with already available anti-rejection drugs. As with any research
agenda, success is by no means assured, and even if all obstacles are overcome, the opera-
tional status is a number of years away. See generally Philip J. Hilts, Gene Transfers Offer
New Hope for Interspecies Organ Transplants, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1993, at C3 (stating
that the medical community is developing tehniques and technology to avert rejection of
transplanted organs by the body's immune system). Recent reports from researchers in
England claim that human trials will begin in three years. See Pigs Bred for Transplant
Organs, Cm. SuN-TIMEs, Mar. 30, 1994, at 34. Regarding artificial replacements, see
supra notes 21 and 22 for a brief discussion of the status of the artificial liver and artificial
heart.
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niques for scavenging organs from the dead and dying. The Ar-
ticle also will address the troubling question of what limita-
tions, if any, should be placed on the actions of living donors,
either in terms of the risks they assume or of the rewards they
receive. Finally, the Article will discuss how to make the most
rational use of those organs that are available for donation, em-
phasizing the need to maximize benefits while minimizing in-
justice. Throughout the discussion, this Article will attempt to
determine whether in our enthusiasm to save one group of pa-
tients and families, we are running roughshod over the interests
of another.2
II. OBTAINING MORE DONORS
A. Cadaveric Donors
The total pool of potential organ donors, that is, those peo-
ple whose brains have died but whose other vital organs remain
in good shape and whose circulation and respiration are being
27. Another subject this Article will not address is whether allowing, let alone en-
couraging, organ transplantation makes economic sense. This Article assumes our society
will provide the necessary resources to transplant whatever organs become available. The
general trend in recent years has been to make transplantation more widely available, both
under private insurance and under the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs. UNITED
NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY FOR
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION AND THE ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NET-
WORK, at IV-8 to IV-10 (1990) [hereinafter, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT]. The ability to pay
for a transplant is a critical factor in making it on an organ waiting list. Id. at IV-l 1. See
also Arthur L. Caplan, Obtaining and Allocating Organs for Transplantation, in HUMAN
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 5, 6 (Dale H. Cowan et al., eds., 1987) (wherein Caplan in-
vented the phrase "green screen" to describe the practice of limiting transplants to those
who can pay). Organ transplantation procedures are very expensive. First-year costs for the
average liver transplant, for example, exceed $200,000, for the average heart transplant,
$140,000, for the average lung transplant, $240,000. See 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, Supra, at
IV-7; Jon R. Doud et al., The Loyola University Lung Transplant Experience, 153
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2769 (1993). Based on the cost estimates in these two reports,
the total transplant bill for 1993 was $1.3 billion (excluding the $600 million spent on
kidney transplants since they are cheaper in the long run than dialysis). One advantage of
the current shortfall in organ supply is that it helps control the number of actual trans-
plants performed. The nation is currently involved in a struggle to make health care ser-
vices available to all while simultaneously reducing the rate of growth in health care ex-
penditures. Achieving the goal of universal healthcare at an affordable price will certainly
be more difficult if expensive procedures like transplants are made widely available. If the
current need for all transplants were satisfied based on the estimates in the Evans study,
infra note 74, the annual bill for organ transplants alone (exclusive of kidney transplants)
would exceed $13 billion. Even these estimates probably underestimate the actual cost be-
cause, except for lung transplants, they are based on 1988 data and do not take into ac-
count costs incurred in subsequent years for medication and other follow-up medical care.
See id.
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artificially maintained, is currently estimated to be no more
than about 11,000 each year.28 Under existing federal law, all
hospitals wishing to retain their eligibility for Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursement must adopt written procedures to "as-
sure that families of potential organ donors are made aware of
the option of organ or tissue donation and their option to de-
cline."129 Many states also have adopted similar requirements.3 0
For a variety of reasons, however, these procedures are often
honored in the breach. Families must be asked about organ do-
nation at the same time that they have just learned of their
family member's death. It is a very emotional and sensitive pe-
riod, made even more so by the sudden and unexpected nature
of the death.31 Health care professionals are understandably re-
luctant to intrude at this time with questions about organ re-
trieval.3 2 Even when the donor family is approached, permis-
sion to remove organs is denied almost half of the time.33 It is,
of course, possible for the potential donor herself to choose
before death whether to donate her organs. Unfortunately,
fewer than 20% of all Americans fill out an organ donor card
28. Roger W. Evans, The Potential Supply of Organ Donors, 267 JAMA 239, 243
(1992).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8(a)(1)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
30. See, e.g., UNIF. ANATOMICAL Gixr ACT § 5(b), 8A U.L.A. 47 (1987), now
adopted in fifteen states.
31. Brain death which qualifies one as an organ donor is ordinarily caused by car
accident, stroke, gunshot wound, or other sudden injury. See 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 5, app. at B-4.
32. One study of midwestern hospitals found that 25% of hospitals with emergency
rooms or trauma centers (the type of hospitals most likely to admit patients who would
become potential organ donors) had no experience with organ or tissue donation. See Ar-
thur L. Caplan & Beth Virnig, Is Altruism Enough?, 6 CRITICAL CARE CLINIcs 1007,
1013 (1990). And in those institutions which did have experience with organ or tissue
donation, many potential donors were not recruited. Id. at 1014. Arthur Caplan, the
bioethicist who first proposed the required request procedure, has since expressed anger
over the health care profession's reluctance to comply with society's "collective desire" and
has argued that health care personnel "need to be taught to make requests, or if they are
too discomfited by death, to yield authority over matters pertaining to procurement to those
more adept at dealing with this harsh reality." Arthur L. Caplan, Professional Arrogance
and Public Misunderstanding, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 34, 37 (1988). Organ procure-
ment organizations, those groups responsible for locating transplantable organs and arrang-
ing for their transportation to recipients, now usually offer to have their own personnel
(who have no pre-existing relationship with the patient's family and who have a vested
interest in acquiring the organs) approach the family. Query the wisdom of such a system.
33. 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27, app. at N-2. See also Caplan & Virnig,
supra, note 32 at 1014 (describing the results of a survey of hospital personnel responsible
for actually requesting organ donations from next-of-kin, many of whom report consent
rates of only 25%).
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or otherwise indicate before death their desire to donate their
organs. 4 Even in those cases where a donor card has been filled
out, many hospitals make it .a policy also to gain family ap-
proval. If the family says no, the organs are not taken.35 The
result is that only 4500 cadaveric donors are obtained each
year, considerably less than the 11,000 or so that are poten-
tially available.
1. Presumed Consent
One way to increase the yield is to adopt a system of pre-
sumed consent. Under this approach, an affirmative consent
from the donor or the family is not required. Consent will be
presumed without evidence to the contrary. Proposals differ in
the extent to which they would offer opportunities to object.
Under so-called "quasi-presumed consent," reasonable efforts
must be made to contact the deceased's family to ensure that
there is no objection to removal of the organs. Only if the fam-
ily cannot be contacted within a reasonable period may the or-
gans be taken without consultation. 8 Under a "pure" pre-
sumed consent system, organs may be removed without seeking
permission so long as neither the donor nor the family has
managed to register an objection."
Advocates of either form of presumed consent make two
claims for this system of organ procurement-that it frees the
family from having to make a difficult choice under traumatic
34. See Diane L. Manninen, Public Attitudes and Behavior Regarding Organ Dona-
tion, 253 JAMA 3111, 3112 (1985).
35. See the discussion at notes 55-69 infra.
36. See Daphne D. Sipes, Does it Matter Whether There is Public Policy for Pre-
sumed Consent in Organ Transplantation?, 12 WITTIER L. REv. 505, 524-26 (1991) (dis-
cussing presumed consent statutes).
37. Id. at 526. The only pure presumed consent statutes adopted to date have been
for removal of corneal and pituitary tissue. Id. at 524-26. No doubt this is anomaly occurs
because corneas and pituitary glands can be taken long after the patient has been removed
from life-support systems and without significantly altering the patient's post-mortem ap-
pearance. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS § 333.10202 (2)(c) (1993) (stating as one of the
requirements for cornea removal that it not "alter postmortem facial appearance"). In
other words, no one from the family will realize it has been done. For a list of jurisdictions
which have adopted pure presumed consent for pituitary glands, corneas, or both, see Erik
S. Jaffe, Note, "She's Got Bette Davis['s] Eyes'" Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal
of Cadaver Organs under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528,
535 n.35 (1990) (listing 17 such jurisdictions). An ethics organization called the Commu-
nitarian Network, founded by sociologist Amitai Etzioni, has endorsed the pure presumed
consent concept for all organs. See Mandatory Organ Donation Sought, N.Y. TIMs, Dec.
23, 1992, at C7.
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circumstances"' and that it would produce greater numbers of
organs for transplantation. 9 Both claims are debatable. As to
the first, it is true that families of the deceased are placed in an
extremely difficult situation when they are asked to donate or-
gans. Family members are usually in a state of shock and acute
grief. The death of their loved one has come suddenly, not
gradually, and they were not prepared for it.4 0 A hospital emer-
gency room provides neither the necessary time nor the proper
environment for making a truly informed decision. 41 Neverthe-
less, under a quasi-presumed consent system, the family still
has to make a very difficult decision under very difficult cir-
cumstances. Under this system, the decision is whether to veto
an organ donation that would otherwise proceed. While it may
be more difficult to say no, it is no less traumatic to decide.42
Even under pure presumed consent, the practical realities of
solid organ donation are such that it is hard to imagine how
organs can be removed without the family finding out and be-
ing forced to decide, once again, whether to object to the proce-
dure. If family members are at the hospital, and the patient's
body is being maintained on artificial support systems, as most
organ donors are, the family will want to be there when the
machines are turned off. That does not happen until the organs
are first removed, events that will be hard to keep from the
family's view. In addition, once the system of pure presumed
consent has been in operation for awhile, families can be ex-
pected to become aware of the new standard practice. In those
cases where the families object to organ donation, we can an-
ticipate that they would be more forthcoming about their oppo-
sition to donation and would not wait to be asked for their con-
sent. In fact, they will have to worry about whether they can
raise their objections quickly enough. 3
38. See, e.g., Arthur L. Caplan, Organ Transplants: The Cost of Success, HASTINGS
CENrER REP. Dec. 1983, at 23, 25-28 (explaining the difficulties experienced by families
who are grieving); Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., Supplying Organs For Transplantation, 68
MICH. L. REv. 811, 830-31 (1970).
39. Caplan, supra note 38, at 28.
40. See supra note 31 (identifying the leading causes of death for solid organ donors
as stroke, car accident, and shootings).
41. See Caplan, supra note 38, at 25-27.
42. See Theodore Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed
Model Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L. Rav. 681, 706 (1988).
43. Moreover, experience in many European countries that have adopted a pure pre-
sumed consent system shows that doctors still ask families for their approval before they
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Presumed consent also may not be that much more effec-
tive as a way to procure organs. If the quasi-presumed consent
system is adopted, families who objected under the old system
would still object under the new one. There might be a modest
increase in donations if families were told that normal proce-
dure is to donate, if we assume that this would increase pres-
sures to conform and "to do the right thing." On the other
hand, one would think that pressures are already fairly high to
approve donations under the current system. After all, what
good are the organs to the deceased, particularly when there
are others whose lives could be saved by these organs? The
only certain change would be for those patients whose families
were difficult to locate, for example, the homeless, the dis-
placed, and the rest of society's unfortunate."' While a pure
presumed consent system would probably do a better job of in-
creasing the number of donations,45 even here, because of the
practical difficulties discussed earlier, many families would
learn about the organ removal anyway, either by direct obser-
vation or by awareness of the change in law regarding the need
to ask for consent, and would be able to express any opposition
they might have to the procedure, thereby reducing the number
of organs made available for transplantation.
There are additional reasons for opposing adoption of the
pure presumed consent system. First, it risks violating the basic
rationale for presumed consent. The primary justification for
any presumed consent system is that it effectuates the true
remove organs. The societal norm against ignoring the family viewpoint is just too strong.
See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Presumed Consent to Organ Donation: A Reevaluation, 1
HEALTH MATRIX 31, 40-41 (1991); Jeffrey M. Prottas, Organ Procurement in Europe and
the United States, 63 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 94, 102 (1985).
44. Robert Veatch, Routine Inquiry About Organ Donation - An Alternative to
Presumed Consent, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1246, 1247 (1991).
45. This result is particularly likely in the case of corneas and pituitary glands,
where removal can take place long after the patient has been declared dead and life sup-
port systems withdrawn. By that time, no one is around to object. Corneas, for example,
are routinely removed up to six hours after the patient's death. See Council on Scientific
Affairs, American Medical Ass'n, Report of the Organ Transplant Panel: Corneal Trans-
plantation, 259 JAMA 719, 720 (1988). Over 40,000 corneal transplants were performed
in 1990. See Francis W. Price et al., Five Year Corneal Graft Survival: A Large Single
Center Patient Cohort, 111 ARCHIVES OPHTHALMOLOGY 799, 799 (1993). That number is
four times the number of kidney transplants done during the same period. See 1994 AN-
NUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at ES-15. (Kidneys are the next most commonly transplanted
organ.) Corneal transplants restore sight to people suffering from a variety of eye disorders.
Their success rate is very high. See Price, supra, at 799.
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desires of the parties. So, for example, when an unconscious
patient is brought into the emergency room, treatment is begun
on the assumption that this is what the patient and/or the pa-
tient's family would have wanted if they had been able to
choose.46  Few would debate this point. Yet our experience to
date clearly shows that many individuals and their families do
not wish to consent to organ removal.' 7 Accordingly, it is not
reasonable to presume their consent.
Widespread opposition to a presumed consent system is
also a distinct possibility. Several public opinion polls have
shown the American public to be decidedly cool to presumed
consent.48 Moreover, families have already challenged the va-
lidity of presumed consent laws in a number of court cases49
related to corneal transplants, the only transplant type for
which presumed consent has been used to generate significant
numbers of organs.50 While most courts have generally upheld
the constitutionality of such programs, in the most recent case,
Brotherton v. Cleveland,51 the court held that the practice of
removing corneas from the deceased's eyes without even exam-
46. See Veatch, supra note 44, at 1247.
47. See text at note 33 supra.
48. See, e.g., Dilip S. Kittur et al., Incentives for Organ Donation?, 338 THE LANCET
1441, 1443 (1991) (52% opposed, 39% in favor, 8% undecided); Manninen, supra note
34, at 3114 (86.5% opposed). Moreover, when organs or tissues have been removed with-
out getting required consents under existing laws, the next-of-kin have been very upset. In
one recent case, for example, the Philadelphia medical examiner removed the brains from
26 patients without getting consents from the families. The brains were sent to the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Medical School, apparently for use in anatomy classes. When the story
leaked out, a number of lawsuits were filed against the city, and a number of families were
very upset. See Walter F. Roche, Jr., Relatives Learn the City Removed the Brains of
Their Dead, PHIL. INQ., June 16, 1994, at Al.
49. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991); State v. Powell,
497 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987); Georgia Lions Bank, Inc.
v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986); Tillman v.
Detroit Receiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
50. See Sipes, supra note 36, at 524-26. Presumed consent laws also have been used
to remove pituitary glands from dead bodies, not to transplant them but to collect human
growth hormone from them for treatment purposes and for scientific study. Id. at 524. In
1985, however, the Food and Drug Administration determined that several patients had
contracted a fatal disease known as Creutzfeldt-Jakob syndrome from growth hormone
shots. Since that time, the naturally derived product has not been used to treat people.
Drug companies have since learned to create the hormone synthetically and have been able
to produce more than enough of the hormone to meet demand. See Kristin E. Holmes,
Jumping at the Chance to Be Taller, PIL. INQ., June 28, 1992, at Hi. The laws allowing
removal of pituitary glands without family consent also have generated significant public
opposition. See Sipes, supra note 35, at 517 n.58.
51. 923 F.2d 477.
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ining the patient's medical records (examination, in this case,
would have revealed that the decedent's wife had expressly re-
fused to authorize such a gift) was an unconstitutional depriva-
tion of property interests without due process of law.52
Even though these corneal removal programs require a rel-
atively minor intrusion into the body of the deceased, an intru-
sion that is not easily detected, they have still generated a sur-
prising amount of opposition. This opposition does not bode
well for more generally applicable presumed consent laws
which would require removal of organs and tissue while the pa-
tient was still on life-support equipment and would cause much
greater violations of bodily integrity.
Pure presumed consent also could operate to undermine
faith in the health care system. The secrecy of the system chal-
lenges the family's belief that all appropriate efforts were made
to save the life of the organ donor. Even under the best of cir-
cumstances, where the family is fully informed about the pa-
tient's condition, treatment, and prognosis, when the patient
dies and the family is asked to consent to organ donation, fam-
ily members may wonder whether the patient was allowed to
die in order to make organs available for others who could
make "better" use of them. When organs are taken in secret,
suspicions will intensify. Secrecy implies that there is a need to
hide something, and the family could easily conclude that the
something being hidden is less than adequate care for the
deceased.
A final problem with pure presumed consent laws is that
they ignore those interests from the donor side of the equation
which deserve the most protection. The current system of organ
procurement shows a great deal of respect for the wishes of the
donor. But once the donor dies, she is not the one who is going
to be affected by what we do to her body.5 8 The people who are
52. Id. at 482.
53. Those who do not agree with this proposition generally have religious beliefs that
stress the importance of bodily integrity for the deceased in connection with proper prepa-
ration for the afterlife. See the discussion at note 68 infra. People with these kinds of
religious beliefs could present problems for a pure presumed consent system. In particular,
pure presumed consent laws may run afoul of their rights under federal law. Under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (enacted by the Congress to reverse the Su-
preme Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Ore-
gon v. Smith, 496 U.S. 913 (1990)-see note 68 infra for further discussion), no govern-
mental body may substantially burden a person's free exercise of religion unless it has a
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going to be affected are the family members she leaves behind.
They are the ones who must live with the decisions that are
made. Unless we are ready to adopt a system that gives the
state complete control over the body of the deceased at the in-
compelling interest in doing so that cannot be served by a less restrictive means. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-1 (Supp. V 1993). While there are questions as to whether the statute really
means what it says here - the statute also says that its purpose is to restore the compel-
ling interest test as it existed in previous cases, which is not the test spelled out in the
statute itself - I assume for present purposes that the statute should be interpreted as
stated in its operative language. For more on this interpretation issue, see David M. Smo-
lin, The Free Exercise Clause, the Religious Freedom Act, and the Rights to Active and
Passive Euthanasia, 10 IssuEs LAw & MED. 3, 39-40 (1994)). When applying this new
statute to presumed consent laws, several questions must be addressed. First, whose interest
in free exercise of religion is being protected? Probably not that of the deceased, because
dead people are generally not thought of as having rights that extend beyond the grave. Cf.
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (finding a "taking" of a property owner's interest
under a federal statute which prevented the devise or descent of the property because the
property right was taken from the owner while the owner was still alive, unlike the instant
case of presumed consent law where the deceased could always make her opposition to
organ donation known while she was still alive and the "taking" only occurs after the
patient's death and only if the patient has not previously expressed her opposition). The
family's interest in the deceased's body is generally characterized as an exclusive right of
control over the body for purposes of burial or other disposition. The family has a cause of
action against anybody who interferes with this right. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 868 cmt. a (1979). In this case, then, the interest being burdened by presumed
consent laws would be the next-of-kin's right to dispose of the body intact, without organ
removal, according to their religious beliefs. Presumed consent laws could allow organs to
be taken against the family's wishes.
The key question then becomes whether the state's interest in doing this can be char-
acterized as compelling and as the least restrictive alternative available. It probably is com-
pelling. Life saving measures are among the most favored in constitutional balancing tests.
See, e.g., Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 26-28,30 (1905) (upholding compulsory smallpox
vaccination law); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2821
(1992) (reaffirming Roe v. Wade's holding that state's compelling interest in protecting the
life of a viable fetus justifies the prohibition of abortion after viability). However, presumed
consent may not be the least restrictive alternative available for saving lives. The state
could, for example, offer to pay donors (or their families if the donor is dead) for organs,
and that approach might very well produce many more organs than a presumed consent
system would. See the text at notes 157-82 infra for a discussion of the advisability of such
an approach. Or it could engage in enhanced public education efforts to convince more
people of the need to donate. In any event, the least restrictive alternative test would be a
difficult hurdle to overcome for any presumed consent system.
For Orthodox Jews, organ donation also can present problems because of the Orthodox
definition of death. For the Orthodox, death is determined by the irreversible cessation of
breathing and cardiac activity. According to many rabbinic authorities, this definition
means that a person being maintained on an artificial respirator, although meeting the
legal definition of death, is still alive and that the removal of vital organs - heart, lung or
liver - cannot be permitted, because it would constitute murder. Therefore, presumed
consent for Orthodox Jews present serious ethical problems. See Abraham Twerski, Jewish
Perspectives, in NEw HARVEsT: TRANSPLANTING BODY PARTS AND REAPING THE BENE-
riTs 187, 190-93 (C. Don Keyes ed., 1991); Mehlman, supra note 43, at 50.
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stant of death,54 something that even presumed consent advo-
cates are unwilling to do, we also should pay attention to the
families of the departed and seek their active approval instead
of doing our best to avoid their input.
The actual operation of the current system for procuring
solid organs for donation recognizes the value of deferring to
the wishes of the next of kin. Under the original (1967) version
of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (currently in effect in
thirty-six states), if an individual makes a decision during her
lifetime to donate her organs, and that decision remains unre-
yoked at the time of her death, her decision does not also re-
quire the approval of her family.55 Nevertheless, it has been the
almost universal practice of medical personnel to seek the ap-
proval of the deceased's family even if the deceased has filled
out an organ donor card or some other relevant document to
indicate that she wishes to donate her organs. 6 If the family
refuses or cannot be located, the organs are not taken. The rea-
sons for not acting are many, including concerns about in-
flicting additional emotional distress on the grieving family and
a fear of bad publicity. 5 The Uniform Act was amended in
1987, in part to make it even clearer that consent of next of kin
was not required, 58 but there is as yet no evidence that prac-
54. An occasional voice has proposed doing just that. Under a system known as
mandatory consent, the state would be allowed to remove all organs suitable for transplan-
tation regardless of the wishes of the deceased or her family. See, e.g., Silver, supra note
42, at 706. Needless to say, few have seconded this notion. It suggests a kind of totalitari-
anism with which most Americans have traditionally been very uncomfortable. If presumed
consent is not acceptable, a fortiori mandatory consent would not be acceptable either.
55. UNiF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT § 2 (1968), 8A U.L.A. 99, 99-100 (1993). In the
comments to this section, the drafters state that subsection (e) of this section "gives legal
effect to the right of the individual to dispose of his own body without subsequent veto by
others." Id. at 100.
56. See UNiF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT § 2 (1968) cmt., 8A U.L.A. 36-37 (1993);
TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 29 (1986) (stating that physi-
cians almost always require consent of the next of kin); Thomas Overcast et al., Problems
in the Identification of Potential Organ Donors, 251 JAMA 1559, 1561 (1984) (stating
that most medical personnel seek approval from the deceased's family even if an organ
donor card is completed).
57. See Overcast, supra note 56.
58. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 2(h) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 33, 36 (1993) (stating
that once a donor has decided to make an anatomical gift, the decision cannot be vetoed
after the donor's death).
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tices have changed in the fifteen jurisdictions that have adopted
the new version of the act.5"
Some may question the wisdom of a policy that does not
automatically defer to the wishes of the deceased with respect
to organ donation. 0 After all, the common law has long
respected the wishes of the deceased regarding the disposition
of real and personal property.61 Why not do the same regarding
the disposition of the body?
Several factors argue against this solution. First, under the
law of wills, there are limitations on the testator's ability to
control the disposition of his real and personal property. For
59. See, e.g., Aaron Spital, The Shortage of Organs for Transplantation: Where Do
We Go From Here?, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1243, 1244 (1991) (noting the limited effec-
tiveness of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act despite intensive efforts); A. David Tammel-
leo, Organ Donation: Whose Decision is it Anyway?, REGISTERED NURSE, Nov. 1993, at
61, 63 (discussing health care providers liability concerns); Health Watch: Clearing up
Confusion About Donating Organs, LA. TIMES, May 3, 1994, at E7 (noting that organ
procurement agencies will not take organ's without family consent).
60. One writer has even suggested a cause of action by potential organ recipients
against those medical personnel who fail to honor a donor's request to donate organs be-
cause they are unable to obtain the consent of next of kin. See Daniel G. Jardine, Com-
ment, Liability Issues Arising Out of Hospitals' and Organ Procurement Organizations'
Rejection of Valid Anatomical Gifts: The Truth and Consequences, 1990 Wisc. L. REV.
1655, 1667-78 (1990). Besides being questionable policy, the proposal also confronts diffi-
culties in attempting to identify the appropriate defendants to sue, which the author ac-
knowledges. Id. at 1680-86. How is one to know which of the hundreds of people who die
each day left organ donor cards that were not honored by their hospital?
61. This respect is generally not, however, a question of constitutional right. The
ability to devise one's property at death can be severely restricted by the state. See Irving
Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) (stating that the U.S. Constitution does not
forbid states from limiting the power of testamentary disposition over property); WILLIAM
J. BowE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, 1 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 3.1, at 62-63 (3d ed.
1960); Daniel J. Kornstein, Inheritance: A Constitutional Right?, 36 RtrrGERS L. REV.
741, 767-69 (1984). The Supreme Court has held, however, that a law which abolishes
both devise and descent of property rights causes a taking of the owner's property right
which must be compensated under the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause. Ho-
del v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-18 (1987).
There do not appear to be any problems with the constitutionality of the proposal to
defer, in case of conflict, to family desires over those of the deceased regarding donation of
organs. The limitation on control over the body is partial, not total. In addition, there is
nothing being taken. In the Irving case, the property at issue went to the Native American
tribe of which the decedent was a member. Id. at 718. Here, the organs stay with the
deceased (who, under current law, could not be paid for them even if they were donated).
Finally, there is no state action here. The hospital, generally a private party, is deferring to
the wishes of another private party regarding disposition of the remains of a third. The
state is not involved. Cf. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 630 (1986) (plu-
rality opinion) (finding that a hospital's refusal to operate on a newborn baby with Down's
syndrome did not constitute violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibiting dis-
crimination based on disability, when the refusal was based on the lack of parental
consent).
HEALTH MATRIX
example, the testator is not allowed to disinherit her spouse. If
she attempts to do so, her spouse may typically elect to take
one-third of the testator's estate as his own, against the testa-
tor's will."2 And although children in this country can be disin-
herited,6" most other common law countries also allow the
court to make necessary adjustments in a will to avoid injustice
for otherwise disinherited children. 4 The analogy to our situa-
tion is clear: Just as the testator should not be able to dispose
of her financial property so as to injure the important financial
interests of her family, so should she not be able to dispose of
her bodily parts so as to injure the important emotional inter-
ests of her family.6 5
Some might argue that the family has no important emo-
tional interests in the donation decision and that this proposal
threatens a substantial impairment of the autonomy rights of
the deceased merely to protect the squeamishness of family
members. But there is much more than simple squeamishness
at stake. The transplantation process unleashes very powerful
emotions. The donor's family members often feel an intense in-
terest in the organs that have been donated. They feel that a
62. See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2203 (1994); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRusTS LAW
§ 5-1.1(a)(1)(A) (McKinney 1981); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-201(a), 8 U.L.A. 74 (1969)
(currently adopted in 15 states).
63. See BOWE & PARKER, supra note 61, § 1.7, at 28.
64. See Deborah A. Batts, I Didn't Ask to Be Born: The American Law of Disinher-
itance and a Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J.
1197, 1213-16 (1990) (stating that claimants left out of wills may seek court action to
provide for their needs). In civil law countries, children may not be disinherited. They are
generally entitled to a fixed share of the decedent's estate. Id. at 1211-13.
65. A few states already recognize that in a conflict between the expressed wishes of
the deceased and her spouse as to proper disposition of the deceased's body, the spouse's
interests may be allowed to prevail in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Sacred Heart of
Jesus Polish Nat'l Catholic Church v. Soklowski, 199 N.W. 81, 82 (Minn. 1924); Leschey
v. Leschey, 97 A.2d 784 (Pa. 1953); Novelli v. Carroll, 420 A.2d 469, 471-74 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1980). The general rule, however, appears to be that the desires of the deceased will
control. See 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 3 (1966). This general deference to the deceased's
wishes can be explained by the importance attached by many to the manner of their own
burial, for both religious and sentimental reasons. The surviving family also may have
strong views, but in a conflict between the two, deference to the deceased makes sense,
particularly when the decision is viewed by many as having serious repercussions regarding
the next life. Deference is not as reasonable, however, when the interests of the deceased
are not as strong, as when deciding whether to donate organs at one's death. Here, if the
deceased's desire to donate her organs is countermanded by her family, it will not adversely
affect her experiences with respect to the afterlife. Accordingly, deference to those still
alive would seem to be more reasonable.
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part of their loved one lives on in the organ recipient.66 They
want to know where the organs went and how the recipients are
doing. In the early days of transplants, doctors often attempted
to satisfy this curiosity and provided the families of cadaveric
donors with the names of the people who had received the or-
gans. But when the families began contacting the recipients
and trying to become involved in their lives, the medical com-
munity decided to make transplantation anonymous. 67 We
should not subject the families of potential cadaveric organ do-
nors to this kind of emotional upheaval against their will. In-
stead, we should protect the emotional health of those who sur-
vive and not focus completely on the desires of those who no
longer have emotions to experience.68
66. The family of William Lucas, the organ donor for Governor Casey, follows this
pattern. Frances Lucas, William's mother, met with the governor in the Spring of 1994.
Ms. Lucas said that it was like meeting with her family and that she believes her son lives
on in the governor. See Tim Reeves, One Year Later: Casey Remembers Transplant Re-
covery Coming 'As Well As We Could Possibly Have Hoped and Prayed For,' PITS-
BURGH PosT-GAzErE, June 12, 1994, at Al. Donor families do not usually get to find out
who the organ recipient is, let alone meet with him, see note 67 infra and accompanying
text, but because of the tremendous publicity surrounding the case, the press discovered the
donor's family and informed family members that the governor had received William's
heart and liver. See Reeves, supra. The family still does not know who received William's
kidneys. Id.
67. See RENEE C. Fox & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS: ORGAN REPLACEMENT
IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 37 (1992) (stating that transplant units now have established poli-
cies of not revealing the donor identity).
68. Autopsy practices in this country also reflect an understanding of the importance
of deferring to the wishes of the decedent's family respecting the treatment of her body.
Autopsies are performed to determine the cause of death or to confirm the accuracy of a
diagnosis already made regarding the cause of death. They are an important tool in educat-
ing the medical community in the proper diagnosis and treatment of illness. See generally
ROLLA B. HILL & ROBERT E. ANDERSON, THE AUTOPSY-MEDICAL PRACTICE AND PUB-
Lic POLICY 43-122 (1988) (describing the historical evolution of autopsy goals and pur-
poses). A typical autopsy is very disruptive to the physical integrity of the corpse. The main
body cavities are opened, the main organs are removed and examined, and their tissues are
sampled for further analysis. The general practice after organs have been examined, how-
ever, is to replace them within the body cavities and to neatly restitch the incisions. Id. at
10. See also KENNEmT V. ISERSON, DEATH TO DUST: WHAT HAPPENS TO DEAD BODIES?
152 (1994).
An autopsy is generally not performed without the family's consent. HILL & ANDER-
SON, supra, at 168-73. However, if the death was sudden or unexpected or occurred under
suspicious circumstances, state statutes typically empower the medical examiner or coroner
to order an autopsy without consent. Even here, though, the state exercises restraint, re-
quiring autopsies only half the time for non-homicidal traumatic deaths (the type that
often produce potential organ donors), but 97% of the time for suspected homicides. See
Daniel A. Pollock et al., Temporal and Geographic Trends in the Autopsy Frequency of
Blunt and Penetrating Trauma Deaths in the United States, 269 JAMA 1525, 1525-26
(1993). The overall incidence of postmortem autopsy in this country has been on the de-
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Second, refusing to defer completely to the desires of the
decedent will not always result in frustrating those desires. In
the vast majority of cases, the circumstances of a person's
death are such that her major organs are not suitable for trans-
plantation. Moreover, in those situations where a person's or-
gans are suitable for transplantation, if family members know
that the deceased wanted to donate her organs, they will proba-
dine, from a peak of around 50% in the late '40s to 15% in 1980 and 11.5% in 1989. Id.
at 1527-28.
Many states also have statutory provisions which provide that autopsies shall not be
ordered over the religious objections of the family of the deceased, unless the state's inter-
est in performing the autopsy is particularly strong. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 52:17B-
88.2 (West 1986) (religious objections respected unless there is "compelling public neces-
sity"); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4210-c (McKinney 1985) (overruling religious objections
requires "compelling public necessity" or "demonstrable need ... under circumstances of
case"); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 313.13.1 (Anderson 1992) (override only if necessary for
criminal investigation or to protect against a substantial threat to public health). Although
the religious objections are supposed to be those of the deceased, the statutes look to the
families to discover those objections, so it is really the beliefs of the family that control.
The teachings of several major religions, including Orthodox Judaism and Islam, see IsEa-
SON, supra, at 157, as well as a number of lessor-known sects, such as Navajo Indians and
the Hmong of Laos, prohibit autopsies. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 221, 226 (1993).
Such deference to religious beliefs is not required by federal constitutional law. In
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), the United States Supreme Court held that "generally applicable, religion-neutral
laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified
by a compelling state interest." Id. at 887 n.3. Prior to the decision in Smith, a trial judge
in the federal district of Rhode Island had ruled that the state medical examiner violated
the religious free exercise rights of the parents of a young Hmong man when the examiner
performed an autopsy on the man without a compelling need and against the parents'
wishes. See Yang v. Sturner, 728 F. Supp. 845 (D.R.I. 1990). Before the court could hold
a hearing on damages, however, the decision in Smith was handed down. Based on Smith,
the trial judge in Yang felt compelled to reverse himself and held that the parents no
longer had a valid claim because the autopsy was performed under a generally applicable,
religion-neutral statute. See Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
Congress recently reversed the Smith decision statutorily with the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-141 § 5, 107 Stat. 14-89 (1993) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (Supp. V 1994)). Under the act, no governmental entity (at any level)
may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion unless it demonstrates that the
burden furthers a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. Id.
§ 2000bb-l(b). The legislative history shows, among other things, that the Congress be-
lieved the act would reverse the results in Yang and other wrongful autopsy cases. See, e.g.,
S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong, 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1993 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 1892, 1897 (citing the second decision in Yang as an example of how the Smith case
had "created a climate in which the free exercise of religion is jeopardized"); 139 CONG.
REc. 514353 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Senator Hatch, co-sponsor of bill,
emphasizing the importance of § 2000bb in preventing unnecessary autopsies). Accord-
ingly, it would appear that the new federal law requires all states to adopt religious exemp-
tions to autopsy rules like those already in existence in New York and New Jersey, which
only permit autopsies against the wishes of the deceased's family when done pursuant to a
"compelling public necessity."
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bly honor her wish in most cases. Thus, the actual number of
cases where the deceased's wishes respecting her organ dona-
tion are contravened will be small.
Finally, while this proposal gives the family veto authority,
it does not empower the family to treat the deceased in a less
respectful way upon her death, only in a more respectful one. If
the deceased has said that she wants no organ donations, the
family will not be empowered to override that directive. In
short, it is not essential to the potential donor's peace of mind
that she know that her organs will be donated on her death,
and therefore we can properly show more consideration for the
peace of mind of those who survive her.69
Instead of playing games with donors and their families,
laws regulating organ transplantation should be structured to
encourage the highest level of voluntary, informed organ dona-
tion with the full cooperation of all concerned. Certainly much
can be done to improve the current system. The main reason
family approval is often such an issue is that the deceased her-
self has not previously expressed her own views on the subject,
either formally through an organ donor card or informally in
conversations with family and friends. One way to deal with
this problem would be through a system of mandated choice.
Individuals could be required to answer questions about organ
donation in order to get a driver's license or to file their tax
returns. A central registry for these responses could be main-
tained and consulted whenever an organ donation situation
arose. If the position of the deceased in favor of organ donation
were clear, the family would be much more likely to consent as
69. A related, and equally misguided, use of presumed consent is for a technique
called preconsent perfusion. Immediately after a patient dies, doctors inject a cold preserv-
ing fluid into her kidneys and her abdominal cavity to arrest the deterioration of those
organs which normally occurs following interruption of the patient's blood supply. Medical
personnel can then seek at their leisure to gain permission of the next of kin to transplant
the kidneys. Presumed consent is a part of the program because the preserving fluid is
injected into the patient without asking consent (consent being presumed). One of the
transplant centers that developed this technique adopted it only after families refused to
grant permission in 35 consecutive cases. See Youngner et al., supra note 24, at 2770.
The problem with this approach, of course, is that procedures are performed on the
deceased patient's body which have no therapeutic value for the patient but which are
intended solely to make organs available for someone else. While this kind of treatment of
the deceased is perfectly acceptable when the family has authorized it, without authoriza-
tion it is simply disrespectful to the family and their emotional concerns. It also makes it
appear as though the medical staff was interested less in doing what it could to save the
deceased's life than it was in salvaging some organs from her body.
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well.7" We might even add a procedure in which family mem-
bers would have the opportunity to concur in advance with the
donor's decision to donate, a concurrence which would be bind-
ing on the family should donation become a possibility. The key
is to encourage donation decisions to be made in calm contem-
plation before the fact, and not in the emotionally charged at-
mosphere following a tragic death.
2. Changing the Requirements for Cadaveric Donors
Assuming for the moment that we are able by means al-
ready discussed, or by some other, more draconian technique
(such as mandatory conscription), to increase the number of
brain-dead, heart-beating cadavers whose organs are made
available for transplantation to 100% of potential donors. As
was previously mentioned, this might yield as many as 11,000
donors per year, or an additional 6500. An initial look at the
current waiting lists for organ donations might suggest that this
would be enough to satisfy the need for many, if not all, organ
types. For example, there are only about 3000 people waiting
for a new heart, 4500 for a new liver, and only a little more
than 1500 waiting for new lungs. 71 And 6500 additional donors
(yielding 13,000 kidneys) would cut the 28,000 person waiting
list for new kidneys almost in half.L7
Of course, assuming a 100% yield for any organ procure-
ment program is not realistic, but there is a more fundamental
problem here. The organ waiting lists have been kept artifi-
cially low because the referring physicians know that current
supplies are so limited.73 Recall, for example, that one-third of
those waiting for hearts and livers die before an organ becomes
70. For further discussion of this concept, see Aaron Spital, Mandated Choice: The
Preferred Solution to the Organ Shortage?, 152 ARCIVES INTERNAL MED. 2421 (1992);
Veatch, supra note 44, at 1248-49.
71. UNOS 1995 Facts, supra note 12.
72. The analysis here exaggerates the number of organs that would be produced. It
assumes that each donor would be able to donate all of her solid organs, that is, that 6500
new donors would yield 6500 hearts, 6500 livers, 13,000 kidneys, and so forth. This as-
sumption is not true. For various reasons, including the overall health of the decedent prior
to her death and the actual cause of death, one or more organs are often not suitable for
donation. In 1993, for example, there were 4845 cadaveric donors overall, but these donors
produced only 2299 hearts, 3442 livers, and 8173 kidneys (out of a possible 9690). See
1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, app. at B-3, D-8, D-16, D-22.
73. See, e.g., Joe Holleman, Organ Recipients Try to Boost Awareness: Parade
Brings out the Lucky and the Hopeful, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Sept. 20, 1993, at lB.
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available. Accordingly, only the best candidates are referred
for transplant. If the supply of organs increases, so will the de-
mand, until the system is again overloaded. One recent study
found that the real annual need for transplanted organs is
40,000 hearts, 18,000 kidneys, 14,000 livers, and 11,000
lungs,74 well beyond the number of organs that could be pro-
vided even if all the brain-dead donated their organs. If the
goal is to find a new organ for everyone who needs one, we
clearly need to look elsewhere.
a. The Pittsburgh Protocol
What might be done to expand the pool of cadaveric do-
nors? As we have already discussed, today's typical cadaveric
donor is a brain-dead patient with artificially maintained car-
diac and respiratory functions. There are, however, other pos-
sibilities. The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center adopted
a new protocol two years ago (the "Pittsburgh Protocol")
designed to allow patients who choose to forgo life-sustaining
treatment to donate their organs.7 5 Under current law, a pa-
tient dependent on a respirator who decides she does not want
to spend the rest of her life that way can insist that the respira-
tor be turned off.76 Ordinarily, she would not be an acceptable
organ donor, because surgeons would have to turn the respira-
tor off long enough so that circulation to her brain cells would
stop and her brain would die. The same lack of oxygen would
cause sufficient deterioration to the rest of her organs that they
would no longer be suitable for transplantation. Under the
Pittsburgh Protocol, however, death would be declared once the
patient had experienced two minutes of cardiac arrest. The pro-
tocol seeks to rely on the alternative definition of death, which
74. Evans, supra note 28, at 240 (citing Roger Evans, The Need for Transplantation
in the United States, in ROGER EVANS, THE NATIONAL COOPERATIVE TRANSPLANTATION
STuDY: FINAL REPORT (1991)).
75. See Youngner, supra note 24, at 2770-71 (discussing the Pittsburgh Protocol).
76. This practice is part of the generally recognized right of patients to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment, even if such refusal results in death. See, e.g., Thor v. Superior
Court, 855 P.2d 375, 382 (Cal. 1993) (discussing a number of state law decisions to this
effect); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160, 163 (Fla. App.), arid 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. 1978) (holding that a competent adult patient with no minor dependents who suffers
from terminal illness may refuse extraordinary medical treatment); McKay v. Bergstedt,
801 P.2d 617, 622-23 (Nev. 1990) (finding that a quadriplegic state prisoner had a right to
discontinue artificial life support).
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states that death can occur not only when the brain is dead but
also when there has been "irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory functions."77 Removal of organs begins imme-
diately after death is declared.
There are at least two problems with this new approach.
First, it violates both the spirit and the letter of the Uniform
Determination of Death Act. Brain death was added to the
traditional definition of death in recognition of the fact that the
traditional definition, namely a cessation of breathing and
heartbeat, is simply a proxy for the real thing, which is death
of the brain, the organ that coordinates the processes which
sustain human life and which create human consciousness.
Brain death inevitably follows shortly after all heart activity
stops. A new definition was necessary because medical technol-
ogy had advanced to the point where heartbeat and respiration
could be maintained indefinitely even when the patient's brain
had stopped functioning forever. The new definition was
adopted to recognize this reality and allow useless therapy to
be discontinued. Under the Pittsburgh Protocol, however, doc-
tors start to remove the patient's organs before her brain is
dead, in other words, before she has really died.
Second, even if we rely on the old-fashioned cardiovascular
definition of death, that definition requires irreversible cessa-
tion of circulatory function. Heart function, however, can often
be restored well after the two-minute stoppage called for in the
Pittsburgh Protocol. In this case, the only reason cessation of
circulatory function is irreversible is that the patient has indi-
cated she wants to die and so does not want her heart resusci-
tated. That is her right. But she still is not really dead until
much later in the process, until her heart has stopped beating
for much more than two minutes. Removing her organs at this
point, before brain death and before her circulatory system has
irreversibly stopped, could subject the transplant team to prose-
cution for murder because the removal of the organs, not the
turning off of the respirator, would be the actual cause of
death. The cases decided to date relieve medical personnel from
criminal liability if they simply stop providing treatment at the
request of the patient or her family and the patient subse-
77. UNiF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 386 (1993) (defining Ie-
gally recognized death).
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quently dies.78 They do not, however, provide immunity for
medical personnel who undertake affirmative actions, such as
providing a lethal injection, to end a patient's life. That is still
considered to be murder. 9
We could change the law so that people no longer need to
be dead before they can donate their organs. Such a change,
however, would contravene the conventional wisdom in the
transplantation field, namely that only people who are already
dead should be able to donate life-sustaining organs." The pri-
mary purpose of such a rule is to protect the interests of incom-
petent patients who may be brain-damaged but are not brain-
dead."' It is easy to imagine good-intentioned medical person-
nel pressuring the next of kin of such patients into deciding
that their loved one's organs could be better put to use by
someone else. These are the very pressures that must be
avoided in order to protect the autonomy interests of all pa-
tients and in order to prevent using some patients simply as a
means to provide another's cure. If the patient indicated before
her incompetency that she wanted life support removed and her
organs donated should she reach her current medical condition,
then we would not need to be so concerned about following this
kind of protocol. But as we have already seen, most people
while they are still alive do not get around to giving consent for
their organs to be donated after their deaths, let alone before.
Some might argue that these concerns could be avoided by
limiting the reach of the Pittsburgh Protocol to these people
who are competent when they decide to stop treatment and do-
nate their organs. I think not. People who are contemplating a
decision to remove life-sustaining treatment are already subject
to a great many outside pressures that may have too much in-
78. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491-92 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669-70 (N.J. 1976), cert. dented 429 U.S. 922 (1976);
In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 751 (Wash. 1983).
79. In Michigan, Dr. Jack Kevorkian is currently on trial for murder for making his
suicide machine available to several patients and assisting them to take their own lives. The
Michigan appeals court has recently upheld the applicability of the Michigan murder stat-
ute to his conduct. See Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487, 493 (Mich. Ct. App.
1994).
80. See Robert M. Arnold & Stuart J. Younger, The Dead Donor Rule: Should We
Stretch It, Bend It, or Abandon It?, 3 KrNNEDY INST. ETmcs J. 263, 264 (1993) (discuss-
ing the origin of the "dead donor" rule requiring that donors be brain dead before their
organs are taken).
81. Id.
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fluence on whether their life continues to be worth living. Am I
being too much of a burden to my children, to my spouse? Am
I using up too much of the family's money in medical bills, or
too much of society's money? Because we place such a high
value on the autonomous decisionmaking of the individual pa-
tient, however, we have accepted these imperfections in the
process and have approved the patient's decision to withhold
treatment so long as she appears competent and it is not obvi-
ous that her will is being overborne.8 2 Nevertheless, we are not
obligated to allow additional factors into the decision-making
equation which have the potential to produce results even fur-
ther removed from the desires and needs of the patient herself.
The possibility of organ donation is one such factor. Now the
patient who debates whether to refuse medical treatment must
worry not only about the effects of her decision on the emo-
tional and financial health of her family, but also about its ef-
fects on the actual survival of another person (or persons, there
being multiple organs at stake). Am I using up organs that
could be more valuably employed by someone else?" This
question is not one we should force sick people to answer.
The temptation to extend the protocol beyond competent
patients to incompetent patients also may prove irresistible.
That, after all, is where the real potential for increased donors
lies. Most respirator-dependent patients are not competent, so
if significant numbers of new organs are to be obtained, incom-
petent patients will have to provide them.8 4 But as we have al-
ready noted, the pressures on next of kin to help other patients
82. Competency is the Achilles heel of autonomous decision making. No agreement
exists on exactly what the word means. The temptation, of course, is to define a competent
person as someone who makes the kind of decisions that I, the evaluator, would make were
I in her shoes. In an oft-cited article on the subject, Drs. Roth, Meisel, and Lidz offer five
possible approaches to determining competency based on whether the patient can (1) make
a choice, (2) make a reasonable choice, (3) make a choice based on "rational" reasons, (4)
show the ability to understand the choices, or (5) actually understand the choices. Loren
H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279,
280-82 (1977). Although option number one cannot be sufficient to assure the patients'
understanding of what they have consented to, the farther we wander from this standard,
the harder it is to preserve the autonomy principle. Id. at 280.
83. If, in truth, the patient decides to stop medical treatment and die because she
wants to give her organs to others and not because her own existence has become intolera-
ble, she would be killing herself to benefit others. This runs afoul of the societal prohibition
on suicide discussed further in the text at notes 145-54 infra.
84. According to one estimate, using severely brain-damaged patients would increase
potential donations as much as 25%. Youngner et al., supra note 24, at 2771.
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in need could easily result in treatment decisions that ignore
the best interests of the incompetent in favor of the person who
needs a transplant.
There are other reasons to be careful about tinkering with
the definition of death to better accommodate organ transplan-
tation. Public acceptance of the current "brain death" defini-
tion of death is already problematic. A "dead" patient who
breathes and whose heart beats is hard to distinguish from a
living patient who merely sleeps.8 5 This difficulty in accepting
the diagnosis of death can be exacerbated by the knowledge
that the newly dead patient is also highly valued as a source of
organs for other patients at death's door.88 In fact, concerns
about premature declaration of death and undertreatment are
the primary reasons people give for not filling out organ donor
cards.8 To prevent those fears from further interfering with
organ donation goals, every effort must be made to avoid the
implication that we are toying with the definition of death, not
because our understanding of what death truly is has changed,
but because we have some other goal in mind.
In this regard, the current legal definition of death as
death of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is defensible
in a way that should make sense to the non-medical public.
Even though the "brain dead" patient on life support may still
look alive, the patient neither has, nor ever again will have, the
capacity for those traits like consciousness or responsiveness
that are the essence of what makes us human beings. Given
85. A recent Florida case demonstrates the problem. In January 1994, Teresa Ham-
ilton, a thirteen-year-old with diabetes, was admitted to a hospital and soon fell into a
coma. After brain scans showed no brain activity and no circulation to the brain, the doc-
tors informed Teresa's parents that Teresa was legally dead and that the ventilator sup-
porting her breathing should be withdrawn. Even though their health insurance had ex-
pired, the parents refused to give their permission to stopping treatment. After briefly
threatening to go to court, the hospital finally agreed to send Teresa home with her parents
while continuing to provide her with treatment at hospital expense. See Hospital Brain-
Dead Florida Girl Will Be Sent Home on Life Support, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1994, § 1, at
9; Hospital Fights Parents' Wish to Keep Life Support for a Brain Dead Child, N.Y.
TiMEs, Feb. 12, 1994, § 1, at 6.
86. The connection can be quite direct. In 1980, for example, a BBC television docu-
mentary that questioned whether kidney donors declared brain-dead were really dead
caused a sudden, although temporary, drop in the number of kidney donations. See Robert
J. Joynt, A New Look at Death, 252 JAMA 680, 681 (1984) (examining in historical
context the concept of death).
87. See Rosemary Robbins, Signing an Organ Donor Card: Psychological Factors,
14 DEATH STUDImEs 219, 220 (1990).
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that assurance, most people can see the futility of trying to
keep vegetative existence alive, and, perhaps more importantly,
can see that the definition of death is not being manipulated to
obtain more organs for transplantation. The same cannot be
said for the Pittsburgh Protocol. The sole reason for declaring
patients dead before circulatory function has irreversibly
ceased and before brain death has occurred is to procure more
organs.
b. Higher-Brain Death
Similar problems exist for yet another possible method of
procuring additional transplant organs. For a number of years,
commentators have proposed a new definition of death, the so-
called "neocortical death," or higher-brain death. The current
definition relies on cessation of functions in the entire brain,
including the brain stem. The brain stem is that portion of the
brain responsible for controlling the vegetative functions of the
human body, for example, respiration, heart rate, body temper-
ature, blood pressure, electrolyte balance, and the like. It is
these functions that must be artificially supplied by the inten-
sive care unit when the brain stem, along with the rest of the
brain, has stopped functioning.88 However, it is the neocortex
of the brain, the cerebrum, which is responsible for conscious
thought, self-awareness, and interaction with the environment.
If that part of the brain no longer functions, goes the argu-
ment, but the brain stem still does, why should we consider the
patient to be any more alive than when the brain stem is not
working? All that the patient is doing for herself is supplying
the same vegetative coordination that hospital machines and
medications can provide. This kind of existence is not life as we
know it. If a higher-brain definition of death is adopted, it
would have great significance for the availability of transplant-
able organs. From 15,000 to 25,000 people currently exist in a
persistent vegetative state, meaning they have a functioning
brain stem but little, if any, higher-brain function. 9 If these
88. See, e.g., Joseph M. Darby, Approach to Management of the Heartbeating
"Brain Dead" Organ Donor, 261 JAMA 2222, 2224-27 (1989) (providing a detailed
description of the complexities of care for brain-dead patients).
89. Council on Scientific Affairs & Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ameri-
can Medical Ass'n, Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or Withhold
Life Support, 263 JAMA 426, 427 (1990) [hereinafter Council Report].
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individuals were declared dead, the supply of potential organ
donors could increase significantly. 0
The major difficulties with this argument are twofold.
First, diagnosing neocortical death is not easy to do. Brain
scans for patients in a persistent vegetative state show severely
depressed, but not absent, energy metabolism in their cortex.9 '
They can have near normal electroencephalograms. They
sleep, they awaken, they make sounds, they react to sounds,
they smile, they cry. 93 While all of these reactions are consid-
ered to be reflexive and not indicative of any conscious decision
making, it is difficult to believe that these people are truly
dead.94 Given the trouble many people have with accepting the
death of those whose entire brains have ceased to function,95
and given the wide variety of life-like behaviors people in a per-
sistent vegetative state are still capable of, declaring that those
whose cerebrums no longer function are dead will be very hard
to justify.9 6 People who do not really believe that a family
member is dead will not be willing to compound this perceived
error by donating her organs before life support is ended.
Moreover, deciding where to make the cutoff between the
dead and non-dead will be exceedingly difficult. When the defi-
nition of death requires no brain function whatsoever, making
the distinction between dead and not dead is fairly easy.97
90. Not all of those in a persistent vegetative state will be acceptable donors. Age
and other medical problems often cause too much damage for their organs to be used.
91. Council Report, supra note 89, at 428.
92. Id. at 428.
93. Id. at 427.
94. Ethicist David Lamb raises additional concerns about how to treat this newly
dead person:
The notion of a still-breathing corpse is morally repugnant. How, for example,
does one dispose of such a being? Should burial or cremation take place whilst
respiration continues? Or should someone take responsibility for suffocating the
"corpse" first? And what would be the outcome if a distraught family member
suffocated a relative who had been vegetative for months? Would it be homicide?
Or would it be seen as unacceptable treatment of a corpse?
DAVID LAMB, ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND Ermcs 65 (1990).
95. See supra notes 85 and 88.
96. It is important to maintain the distinction between allowing people to die by
withholding treatment because their lives are no longer worth living and declaring people
to be dead so that their life-support systems must be withheld.
97. Physicians employ a number of clinical tests to establish brain death. They in-
clude testing for brain stem reflexes (pupil sensitivity to light, spontaneous respiratory ef-
fort when ventilator is withdrawn), testing for brain metabolic activity (electroencephalo-
gram, or EEG, four-vessel intracranial angiography to measure for blood circulation in the
brain), and testing for the presence of drugs, such as barbiturates, that can cause tempo-
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However, once we accept that a dead person can still have
some brain function, how do we decide how much brain func-
tion she can have? How do we know if there really is no
higher-brain function if brain scans still show some level of en-
ergy metabolism in their cortex, and if they can still exhibit
many of the same emotional states as normal human beings?
We think that they have no conscious awareness, but how can
we know for sure?
Even if we can separate those with absolutely no higher-
brain function from those who have only the tiniest amount,
how can we say that those with only the tiniest amount of
higher-brain function are any more human, any more alive,
than those with none? So begins our slide down the slippery
slope. As we slide along, utilitarian concerns will continue to
contaminate the process of deciding who is really dead. As with
competent persons who are on life support, the pressure to
think not of the welfare of the incompetent person but of the
other patients who could make better use of these organs will
be overwhelming. In close cases, it will be far too easy to de-
clare the incompetent patient dead and get on with the business
of putting her organs to work elsewhere.
3. Future Trends in Cadaveric Donations
The trend for eligible cadaveric donors does not look good.
The public health system in this country is currently expending
a great deal of effort and money to reduce the incidence of
preventable death, particularly death by injury. These efforts
have met with a certain degree of success. Highway traffic fa-
talities, for example, have fallen in the last decade from a peak
of 51,000 in 1980 to the current level of 40,000.98 It is precisely
these kinds of preventable deaths that produce the greatest
number of cadaveric donors.99 So, as we save one group of citi-
rary cessation of brain activity. Only when all of these tests are negative is the patient
declared dead. See President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Guidelines for the Determination of Death, 246
JAMA 2184, 2185-86 (1981).
98. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1993, at 621 (113th ed. 1993); NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN., 1993 TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2 (1994). Actual fatalities for 1993 were
40,115, a slight increase from the 1992 total of 39,250.
99. Of the 4845 cadaveric organ donors in 1993, at least 54% (2619) died of trau-
matic injuries such as motor vehicle accidents, gunshot or stab wounds, head trauma, as-
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zens, we doom another. This state of affairs highlights the un-
derlying tragedy of reliance on cadaveric donors: it requires
death to produce life.
The only category of death by injury that has shown sig-
nificant growth in recent years is death by firearm. Between
1968 and 1991, firearm deaths increased by 60%, to an annual
total of more than 38,000.100 Relying on firearm fatalities as a
major new source of organ donors, 011 however, has its disadvan-
tages. One would certainly hope that future efforts to control
violent crime would be more successful than those of the past.
Furthermore, the victims of violent crime do not come equally
from all racial groups in this country. Unlike traffic fatalities,
for example, in which the races are equally at risk for death,
black males are more than three times more likely than white
males to die by gun."0 2 The net effect is that continued reliance
on cadaveric donors could mean more and more white patients
relying on an increasingly violent society to produce the in-
creasingly black donors that the patients need to survive.103 For
the time being, Whites continue to donate more organs than
they receive (mainly because African-Americans suffer from
much higher rates of kidney disease than do Whites)." How-
ever, perceptions are already growing in some parts of the Afri-
can-American community that Blacks are valued primarily as
spare parts.10 5 If this perception ever becomes a reality, it will
be a cause of tremendous social tension in our society.
phyxiation, and drownings, and the cause of death for an additional 7 % was listed as
"other." See 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, app. at B-4.
100. To be precise, annual firearms fatalities increased from 23,875 to 38,317. U.S.
Dep't of Health and Human Services, Deaths Resulting From Firearm- and Motor-Vehi-
cle-related Injuries, United States, 1968-1991, 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
37 (Jan. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Firearm Deaths].
101. Between 1988 and 1993, the number of cadaveric donors who died from gun-
shot or stab wounds did increase 38%, from 625 to 863. See 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 5, app. at B-4.
102. See Firearm Deaths, supra note 100.
103. Not surprisingly, William Michael Lucas, the man who supplied the organs for
Governor Casey, was a 34 year-old African-American man who was pistol-whipped to
death on the front steps of his mother's home. Belkin, supra note 2, at A16.
104. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, app. at B-4, D-6, D-15, D-22 (showing
that in 1993, whites comprised 78.5 % of all cadaveric donors, but only 64.1% of all cadav-
eric kidney recipients, 76.5% of liver recipients and 81.7% of all heart recipients).
105. Voices of concern have already been raised in the African-American community
about this problem. In a speech in Toledo, Ohio, for example, Louis Farrakhan, leader of
the Nation of Islam, charged that one reason White Americans were not concerned about
stemming the tide of Black-on-Black violence is because such violence provided new
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B. Living Donors
1. Kidneys
Dead people are not, however, the only possible source of
lifesaving organs for people with end-stage organ disease. In
some circumstances, living donors also can supply the necessary
spare parts. Traditionally, living donors have played their larg-
est role in supplying replacement kidneys. For years, family
members have been donating kidneys to their brothers and sis-
ters, their children, and their parents. Last year, 25 % of the
11,000 kidneys transplanted in this country were obtained from
living donors.10 6 Despite their large numbers, living donors
have always been a controversial subject within the medical
profession, primarily because using them violates one of
medicine's basic tenets - do no harm.10 7 The removal of a kid-
ney is a major surgical operation, and can bring with it all of
the usual complications, some serious, such as infection, blood
clots in the lungs, or injury to other organs, and some not so
serious, such as incisional pain or excessive scarring.10 8 Fortu-
nately, serious surgical complications happen in only 2.5% of
all kidney removals.'0 9 The ultimate complication, of course, is
sources of organs for donation. See Farrakhan Says Blacks Just "Parts," CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, May 2, 1994, at Al (referring to Black-on-Black violence, Farrakhan states
"[w]hen you're killing each other, [White Americans] can't wait for you to die ...
[y]ou've become good for parts.")
106. UNOS 1995 Facts, supra note 12.
107. Irwin Kleinman & Frederick H. Lowy, Ethical Considerations in Living Organ
Donation and a New Approach: An Advance-Directive Organ Registry, 152 ARcHIVES IN-
TERNAL MED. 1484, 1484 (1992) (stating "[n]owhere else in medicine is a part of a
healthy person removed without the procedure being of direct physical benefit to that
individual.").
[Surgeons] have always been profoundly uneasy about the fact that transplanting
an organ from a living donor requires them to aggressively violate the basic moral
tenet of their profession to do no harm by seriously wounding an individual who is
neither sick nor a conventional patient - albeit on behalf of someone who is mor-
tally ill and has sought their help.
Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 67, at 39.
108. See Kleinman & Lowy, supra note 107, at 1485. The somewhat limited infor-
mation availilable suggests that long-term renal function for people with only one kidney
remains good. The donor's remaining kidney enlarges until it can perform the necessary
blood filtering function on its own. See Leon G. Fine, How Little Kidney Tissue Is
Enough?, 325 Naw ENG. J. MED. 1097, 1097 (1991). There may be a mild tendency to-
ward increased levels of protein (microalbu- minuria) and other contaminants (creatinine,
for example) in the urine, but none of these changes appears to pose any significant threat
to the health of the donor. See Lantos & Siegler, supra note 9, at 273.
109. See Kleinman & Lowy, supra note 107, at 1485.
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death. About twenty people are thought to have died as a di-
rect consequence of donating a kidney."'
The harm that can result from donating a kidney, how-
ever, must be viewed in the context of the potential recipient's
situation. At one time, a patient suffering from end-stage renal
disease would die without a transplant. Today, however, many
people with failed kidneys can be maintained for long periods
on dialysis, and they are eligible to receive a transplant organ
from a cadaveric donor. Nevertheless, dialysis is not a perfect
substitute. The quality of life for patients on dialysis is often
seriously compromised."' Moreover, patients cannot live for-
ever on dialysis. The annual death rate exceeds 20%. 112
Some commentators are also troubled by the extreme gen-
erosity of living organ donations. Donating a solid organ is
often called "the gift of life." Social scientists generally agree
that most gifts are not a one-way transaction between donor
and donee. Even as a gift is received it creates an obligation on
the part of the recipient, at some undetermined time and in
some as yet undefined way, to repay the gift."x3 Not an exact
equivalent, necessarily, but a repayment nonetheless. There are
many examples of this to which we can all testify from per-
sonal experience - the dinner invitation to a neighbor's house,
the unexpected Christmas present, two weeks of cat-sitting dur-
ing vacation, that last-minute cup of flour for your child's
birthday cake. All must be remembered, all must be repaid.
110. Lance Morrow, When One Body Can Save Another, TIME, June 17, 1991, at
54, 57 (citing Thomas Starzl, a leader in the transplantation field). In a 1986 survey, four
out of 89 responding kidney transplant centers reported at least one death resulting from
donation. Aaron Spital et al., The Living Kidney Donor: Alive and Well, 146 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1993, 1994 (1986). No central registry for this kind of information ap-
pears to exist. Nevertheless, it seems inevitable that occasional donor fatalities will con-
tinue to occur. Alan F. Ross & John H. Tinker, Anesthesia Risk, in ANESTHESIA 721 (3d
ed. 1990). For instance, the risk of death associated with general anesthesia, a necessary
part of any organ removal, is currently estimated at about 1 in 10,000. Id. There are also
the additional risks associated with major surgery, such as infection and hemorrhage. As a
general matter, one can reduce but not eliminate the risks of organ donation.
111. For a description of the dialysis process, and its limitations, see supra note 20.
112. See William Owen, Jr. et al., The Urea Reduction Ratio and Serum Albumin
Concentration as Predictors of Mortality in Patients Undergoing Hemodialysis, 329 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1001, 1001 (1993). See also Port et al., supra note 20, at 1340.
113. See, e.g., PETER M. BtAu, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 89-93
(1964) (discussing the notion of implied reciprocity in the giving process); MARCEL MAUSS,
THE GIFT 1, 3 (Ian Cunnison trans., 1967). For an overview of the gift-giving literature on
this point from a law professor's perspective, see Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form,
64 IND. L. 155, 194-98 (1989).
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The unrequited gift creates an imbalance in the social fabric. It
makes the recipient lose face and withdraw from interaction
with the community.
According to the critics an organ donation is a "gift" with
a difference. It is a gift so generous that it can never be repaid.
The typical organ recipient will never be able to save the life of
her donor. Any other kinds of gifts that the recipient tries to
substitute pale to insignificance when measured against the
generosity of the donor's initial present. Given this imbalance,
the donor may make continual demands for the recipient to ac-
knowledge the magnitude of the donor's gift, demands that can
make the recipient feel forever in the donor's debt. The social
balance cannot be regained. Psychologists Renee Fox and
Judith Swazey have dubbed this phenomenon "the tyranny of
the gift. 1 14 On rare occasions, kidney recipients can feel such
guilt over their inability to repay this gift of life that they may
have to sever relationships with the donor.116 This disruption of
relationships cannot happen with a cadaveric donor, because
there is no preexisting relationship to disrupt and because the
identity of the donor and her family is generally not disclosed
to the recipient."1 6
I have doubts, however, about the accuracy of this charac-
terization of the gift-giving process as it relates to organ trans-
plants. There are thousands of people, mostly bone marrow and
blood donors, who have made lifesaving donations of their tis-
sues to others anonymously and without expectation of any re-
ciprocation or payback. Similar patterns of behavior are evi-
dent in the outpouring of financial and material support for
people suffering from hurricane, famine, or other natural disas-
ter. For donors in these situations, their only reward is the sat-
isfaction of knowing they have helped others in time of need. 17
From the recipient's point of view, to the extent that they feel
burdened by the enormity of the gift, they can repay by mak-
ing similar anonymous donations to others in need.
114. See Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 67, at 40.
115. Id. at 40-41.
116. The recipient can, however, experience the same feelings of guilt over his inabil-
ity to repay the gift. Id. at 41.
117. Or, perhaps, donors receive the approbation of their peers for having performed
in a socially desirable fashion. See, e.g., BLAu, supra note 113, at 259-61.
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Living kidney donations, of course, are not made anony-
mously, but that does not mean that living kidney donors can-
not be motivated by the same feelings of generosity as those
whose gifts are made without knowing the recipient. While
there certainly have been cases where recipients felt uncomfort-
able about their ability to repay the organ donation or where
donor-recipient relationships are less than ideal post-transplant,
these cases are a distinct minority.118 In a large majority of
cases, the transplant has a positive effect, with both recipients
and donors reporting greater closeness after the transplant than
before. 19 For most participants, this is not a traumatic event.
Moreover, even if we assume that living donation has neg-
ative psychological implications for many patients, we must
still ask this question: negative as opposed to what? The options
for people who need a transplant are not that great. Those with
kidney disease face years on dialysis with significantly reduced
quality of life and possible death as they await a cadaveric or-
gan. For those needing other organs, 11° the only option is death.
Sacrificing a relationship to save their own life makes sense for
these patients. Even for the donor, there ought to be no long-
term regrets over the ultimate wisdom of the decision. If she
cared enough to donate the organ in the first place, it should
still be worth it, even if her relationship with the recipient has
suffered.
Finally, living donors may experience depression and re-
sentment if, as happens about 10% of the time within the first
year alone,' 2 ' the donated kidney is rejected and the recipient
is forced back onto dialysis. 22 They are left wondering why
they bothered to expose themselves to such personal risk and
118. See ROBERTA G. SIMMONS ET AL., GIFT OF LIFE: THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL IMPACT OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 172 (1977) (reporting that approximately 20%
of recipients feel uncomfortable that they cannot pay the donor back and that roughly 7 %
of recipients and 6% of donors feel their relationship has become more difficult after the
transplant).
119. Id. at 183 (reporting that there is an increased closeness between recipients and
donors after organ transplantation).
120. Kidneys are not the only organ which can be given by living donors. See infra
part II.B.2 for a discussion of the potential for living liver and lung donations.
121. See 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, app. at E-5. Rejection rates rise to
12% after 2 years and 16% after 3 years. Id. at E-16.
122. See, e.g., John R. Marshall & Carl H. Fellner, Kidney Donors Revisited, 134
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 575, 576 (1977) (suggesting that when the recipient of an organ dona-
tion dies, the donor may have negative feelings or ambivalence about having donated).
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discomfort. Such problems do not arise if cadaver organs are
rejected. The deceased donors have not been exposed to en-
hanced risk. They have no second thoughts, and their families
are not likely to be upset. They tried to bring about something
positive from their tragedy, but it just did not work.
There are, on the other hand, a number of advantages to
living kidney donations. Living donors often provide a better
tissue match between donor and recipient. The proteins deter-
mining tissue compatibility are inherited and are more likely to
be the same or nearly so when donor and donee are related. A
better tissue match means a reduced risk of rejection and a
much greater likelihood that the transplanted kidney will last a
long time in its new home.' 23
There are also substantial psychological benefits flowing to
kidney donors. While recipients may sometimes feel distress at
their inability to adequately repay the donor's generosity, do-
nors are almost universally overjoyed at the opportunity to
make such a big difference in the life of someone they care
deeply about.124 Individuals do not often have the chance to do
something that means so much to another human being. Unlike
the family of the cadaveric donor, which, when it decides to
donate, is struggling to find meaning in what otherwise seems a
senseless tragedy, the living donor can directly experience the
happiness that her donation brings unencumbered by tragedy.
The decision to donate is usually a very easy one for family
members to make. As one commentator explains, it is "a deci-
sion so 'instantaneous' that it is often taken before the trans-
plant team has had time to launch a process of informed con-
123. See 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, app. at E-11, E-19 (noting that the
one-year graft survival for closely matched, living kidney transplants is 95.2% compared
with the one-year survival of 80.3 % for the average unrelated cadaveric transplant). Long-
term survival for transplanted organs is also much better when donor and recipient have
identical tissue types. The average transplanted kidney between siblings with the same tis-
sue type will last 25 years. The average unmatched cadaver kidney transplant will last only
seven years. See Terasaki, supra note 18. Cadaveric kidneys are now routinely tissue-typed
and are given automatically to a patient on the waiting list who has the same tissue type.
See 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27, app. at L-2, L-3. Such "matched" transplants
also have shown significantly better short- and long-term survival. See Steve Takemoto et
al., Survival of Nationally Shared, HLA-Matched Kidney Transplants from Cadaveric
Donors, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 834, 834-35 (1992) (concluding that "the collaborative
renal-transplantation program for HLA matching of donors and recipients yielded an in-
creased rate of one-year graft survival and an estimated half-life for matched grafts twice
that for mismatched grafts.").
124. See Marshall & Fellner, supra note 122, at 575.
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sent. ' 125 After the transplant is over, most donors report that
the donation was one of the high points of their lives and that
they feel better about themselves for having done it. 26
Traditionally, living donors have been restricted to "blood
relatives" of the patient. As has been discussed above, blood
relatives are more likely to be a better tissue match and there-
fore to provide a kidney for transplantation that is less likely to
be rejected by its host. This policy also reflects a longstanding
suspicion in the medical profession for the motives of anyone
not related to the patient who wants to donate an organ. 27
Such donors, healthcare workers believe, cannot be acting out
of altruism. Perhaps they suffer from mental illness. Perhaps
they are being paid. 28
Unfortunately, not every kidney patient has a family
member who is both able and willing to donate. As the average
waiting time for people on the kidney organ list exceeds 600
days, 29 and as some groups of recipients are waiting as long as
five years, 30 the push to find new donors has grown more in-
tense. Hence, in the last few years, small but significant num-
bers of unrelated living kidney donations have begun to oc-
cur. 3 ' The greatest number of these have come from the
patient's spouse, and most of the rest have also been "emotion-
ally related," that is, in-laws, close friends and the like. Never-
theless, there have been donors who are simply co-workers, bus-
iness associates, or acquaintances of the recipient. 3 2 While
these extraordinary acts of generosity ought to be applauded,
125. See Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 67, at 33.
126. See, e.g., SIMMONS ET AL, supra note 118, at 178 (finding that one year after
the transplant operation, roughly 70% of donors felt that donating an organ made their
lives "more meaningful," while less than 5% had significant negative feelings about
donation).
127. See Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 67, at 39, 47.
128. Id. at 47.
129. See 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, app. at G-7.
130. UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE US.
SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS AND THE ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, at 111-26 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 ANNUAL REPORT].
131. In 1991, for example, 86 of the 2382 kidneys donated by living persons came
from unrelated donors. Gina Kolata, Unrelated Kidney Donors Win Growing Hospital Ac-
ceptance, N. Y. TIMES, June 30, 1993, at C14. That number represents a 50% increase
over 1988, and the upward trend continues. In a July 1993 survey, kidney transplant cen-
ters reported having performed 195 unrelated living kidney transplants during the past
year. See Aaron Spital, Unrelated Living Kidney Donors, 57 TRANSPLANTATION 1722,
1723-24 (1994).
132. See Kolata, supra note 131, at C14.
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even encouraged, we might want to erect some barriers to en-
sure that the decision to donate is determined freely. That
could mean, for example, banning donations by employees to
their employers, or debtors to their creditors.
We also should be aware that these kinds of donations cre-
ate a greater risk of generating monetary payments for the or-
gans involved than do more traditional donations.133 Federal
law forbids the sale of organs and most body tissues for trans-
plantation." 4 Current organ donation practices make compli-
ance with this law easier. Cadaver organs are distributed on a
strictly anonymous basis (meaning that the donor's family and
the recipient cannot get together to make a deal).1 5 Live dona-
tions, though directed toward a particular recipient, are usually
made from one family member to another (a situation that one
would ordinarily not expect to generate cash payments). If we
allow more directed donations by living donors to unrelated
persons, there will be greater opportunities for money to
change hands under the table. We could attempt to police this
by requiring evidence of a prior relationship between donor and
donee (such as at the office or in the neighborhood) and by
requiring the parties to sign papers certifying under pain of
prosecution that no money had been paid for the organ. But
there are limits to what one can do.18 The bottom line, how-
ever, is that unrelated kidney donation by the living is the kind
133. For many in the transplantation field, use of living donors is only acceptable if
every effort is made to ensure that organs being made available are truly donated and not
purchased. See, e.g., Arthur Caplan, Must I Be My Brother's Keeper?, 25 TRANSPLANTA-
TION PROCEEDINGS 1997, 1999 (1993) (stating that "the transplant community [must]
make it clear that [financial] motives are not acceptable and that liver and other transplant
specialists will not knowingly utilize someone as a source if money is known to be in-
volved.") For further discussion of the issue of paying for organ donation, see infra part
II.B.4.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a), (b) (1988) (stating it is a felony "for any person to know-
ingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for
use in human transplantation").
135. See Patricia Edmonds, As Casey Recovers, A Family's Tragedy Exposed, USA
TODAY, June 17, 1993, at 3A; Russell E. Eshleman, Jr. & Susan Fitzgerald, Transplant
Made Public Figures of Donor's Family When Casey's Life Was Saved, PHIL. INQ., June
16, 1993, at A12.
136. Unrelated donors also can avoid the guilt pressures sometimes found in intra-
familial donation situations. Since unrelated donors do not feel they have to give, when
they do, the gift is truly voluntary. See Spital, supra note 131, at 1725.
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of altruistic behavior that a society obsessed by the cult of indi-
vidualism would be wise to encourage."'
2. Other Living Donors
There have also been recent developments in other kinds of
living donor transplantation. The primary obstacle to most live
organ donations is that they kill the donor. Kidneys are an ex-
ception to the usual rule because everyone has two of them,
and one can be sacrificed without serious adverse effects to the
donor. Not so with livers and hearts. However, the hydraulic
pressure to find new sources of organs has produced creative
ways around even these limitations. It started with the liver.
Even though people only have one, the liver has amazing pow-
ers of regeneration. If damaged in an accident, for example,
and surgically reduced to remove dead tissue, if at least one-
fifth of the liver remains intact, it will eventually grow back to
its original form and function.138 Faced with ever increasing
waits for liver transplants, especially for children, and patients
who were dying while waiting, physicians at the University of
137. The creation of a registry of people who would be willing to donate a kidney
anonymously to someone in need should even be considered. A similar system has been
adopted for patients needing a bone marrow transplant. See Anderson, supra note 13, at
485-86. To date almost one and a half million people have registered to give marrow dona-
tions to people they do not know, and thousands of marrow transplants have been per-
formed. See Howard Wolinsky, Registry Links Patients, Bone-Marrow Donor's Family
Friend Donates Part of Liver to Boy, 9, CH. SUN-TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1995, at 5455. A registry
for kidney donations would make the most sense if transplants were limited to recipients
whose tissues closely matched those of the donor. These transplants have a significantly
higher success rate. See supra note 123. The prospect of providing a kidney with a much
longer useful life that requires lower doses of immunosuppressive drugs (and their often
hazardous side effects) might provide a sufficient incentive to convince someone to under-
take the perils of donation on behalf of someone who was a stranger to her. Requiring a
close tissue match also would prevent every member who joined the registry from automat-
ically being required to give a kidney. Given the current shortage of cadaver kidneys for
transplant, there would be an immediate demand for kidneys from everyone who joined the
registry. Given that kidney donation poses significantly greater risks for the donor than
bone marrow donation and requires a much longer recovery period, it would seem appropri-
ate to give greater protections to (and provide greater assurances of transplant success for)
those willing to donate to people they do not know. Even with these protections, however,
most people may not be willing to make this kind of a physical sacrifice for a stranger
without some kind of compensation. For discussion on the desirability of paying for these
kinds of donations, see the text infra part II.B.4.
138. See, e.g., E. L. MacIntosh & G.Y. Minak, Hepatic Resection in Patients with
Cirrhosis and Hepatocellular Carcinoma, 174 SURGERY, GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRIUCS
245, 246 (1992) (citing George T. Pack et al., Regeneration of Human Liver after Major
Hepatectomy, 52 SURGERY 617, 617 (1962)).
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Chicago decided to embark on a program of transplanting por-
tions of adult livers into the bodies of children.""9 The donors
are typically parents of the sick children, although other rela-
tives have sometimes been called on to donate. Eighty-five par-
ent-child living liver transplants have since been performed at
the hospital, with very favorable results. 140 The University of
Chicago hospital is planning to expand the program to include
transplants to adults. 14' The worldwide total of living parent-
child liver transplants has now exceeded 350, with only one do-
nor fatality. 142
A similar pattern developed for lung transplantation. Nu-
merous patients were waiting in vain for organs, many of them
children. Desperate families and physicians were looking for
some way out of their dilemma. Living donation was the only
option. Lungs are a kind of middle case between livers and kid-
neys. They do not regenerate like the liver when a portion is
removed. On the other hand, like kidneys, every person does
have two of them, and we can live with only one. However,
unlike the person with only one kidney, a person with only one
lung does suffer significant activity restrictions. So, for living
lung transplants, physicians have compromised: instead of re-
moving an entire lung for transplantation, they only take a por-
tion (or lobe) of one lung, thereby minimizing the effect of the
procedure on the donor's pulmonary function. 4  But this cre-
ates its own problem. One lobe is often not enough lung tissue
to provide adequate function for the patient. The solution?
139. Peter A. Singer et a]., Ethics of Liver Transplantation with Living Donors, 321
NEw ENG. J. MED. 620, 620 (1989). The hospital undertook a year-long ethical evaluation
of the proposal before beginning any operations. Based on previous partial liver removals
during cancer surgery, the risk of death for the donor was estimated at "close to zero" with
the risk of major postoperative complications at "less than 5 percent." Id. at 620-21. Like
their kidney counterparts, liver transplants from living donors also have higher success
rates than those from dead donors. See Amanda Husted, Relations Often Come to Rescue
as Organ Donors, ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 2, 1994, at C4.
140. See Wolinsky, supra note 137, at 5455; Transplant Team Branches Out, OR-
LANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 5, 1993, at G7 (reporting that the one year recipient survival rate
for living-donor transplants to children is 88%).
141. Id. No adult to adult transplants have been performed in Chicago to date. See
Anne Fahy-Morris, Living Donor's Liver Enhances Survival, L.A. TimEs, Feb. 19, 1995, at
A30.
142. Id.
143. The first such operation was performed in December 1990. See Marsha F.
Goldsmith, Mother to Child: First Living Donor Lung Transplant, 264 JAMA 2724
(1990).
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Take one lobe from each parent. While this provides enough
lung capacity for the patient, it simultaneously raises the stakes
on the donor side of the equation. As one commentator put it,
"[T]his was probably the first surgery that had a potential
mortality rate of 300 percent."144 It is important, however, not
to exaggerate the risks involved. The surgery is not inherently
more dangerous than the surgery for livers or kidneys. While
the odds of complications may be doubled with two donors, the
overall risk is still low. Although only a handful of such sur-
geries have been performed to date,145 primarily for patients
with end-stage cystic fibrosis, the results have been promising.
With over 30,000 cystic fibrosis sufferers nationwide, the possi-
bility of widespread use for this "two-donor" procedure cannot
be ignored.
3. Assumption of Risk
Is the assumption by living donors of greater and greater
risks for the sake of organ recipients something we should be
worried about? To take an extreme situation, would we allow
living organ donations that kill the donor? Consider, for exam-
ple, the case of the teenage son with a terminal heart condition
and the fifty-year-old father who wants to save his son's life.
Unfortunately, there is not, nor probably ever will be, a way to
give just a part of your heart to someone else and have it do
any good. You must give the whole heart, and in so doing, sac-
rifice your own life. So why should we not let the father give
his heart to his son? 46 How is this different from a host of
144. Sheryl Stolberg, Historic Lung Transplant Draws a Mixed Reaction, LA.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1993, at Al (statement of Mark Siegler).
145. Cheryl Clark, Transplant Patient, 16, is Eager to Go Home: Doctors Optimis-
tic Following a Rarely Tried Procedure, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRImB., Aug. 21, 1993, at B2
(examining the fifth such procedure to date).
146. Most commentators seem to accept that removing organs for transplantation
that cause the inevitable death of the donor is not permissible, even if they are not exactly
sure why:
To date, at least in Western centers, living individuals have not been regarded as
an appropriate source of unpaired, entire vital organs whose removal would result
in their death.... But what about the autonomy interests of the willing, perhaps
eager donor, or the great good that might be done for the otherwise doomed pa-
tient? We-at least those of us not yet properly resocialized to the soothing,
highly professionalized and de-emotionalized jargon of our post-1984 world-tend
to recoil. Whatever our commitment to donor autonomy .... this cuts it a bit too
close, for some of us, for now.
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other situations where self-sacrificing behavior is tolerated,
even encouraged - the soldier who falls on the grenade to save
his buddies, the sailor who slips into the freezing water so the
overloaded lifeboat will not sink, the search team member who
dies in an avalanche trying to rescue survivors in a mountain-
side plane crash?
There are two crucial distinctions to recognize here. The
first has to do with the relative risk faced by rescuer and
rescuee. When both are threatened with the same fate, basic
utilitarian principles sanction the sacrifice of one so the other
might live. But the father who asks to give his heart to his son
initially faces no risk of harm. If the father is allowed to sacri-
fice his life, there is no net gain to society, only one life traded
for another.147 The only rescue behavior that makes sense is
one which endangers him less than it promises to benefit his
son. So, for instance, a blood transfusion that could save his
son's life would make utilitarian sense.
A second difference resides in the level of societal involve-
ment. In many rescue situations, such as that of the soldier
jumping on the grenade, there is no time to plan, no time to
think through the options. People act on impulse, on emotion,
and there is little that others can do to affect their behavior.
Even if there were time, it also might not be possible to affect
suicidal behavior. Even if we did not approve of the rescuer's
intentions, we might not be able to affect her actions, especially
if she was able to carry out her plan alone. But when there is
time to think and plan, and when the rescuer needs the support
of others to carry out her plans, society can insist that the risk
undertaken be a reasonable one. The father who wants to give
Alan J. Weisbard, A Polemic on Principles, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 217, 220 (1993).
But see Eric Rakowski, Taking and Saving Lives, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1063, 1107-09
(1993) (suggesting that respect for the principle of autonomy requires accepting a person's
decision to die so that she may give her organs to others).
147. One might argue that a heart transplant from father to son does produce an
overall benefit to society because it results in a greater number of years lived. As in our
example, a heart goes from a man who could be expected to live only 25 more years to a
son who has 50 years of additional life expectancy. Such a net gain in years of life, how-
ever, is not likely. Even if the transplant is initially successful, it is likely to fail well before
50 years. The three-year survival rate for heart transplants is only 74.6%, see 1994 AN-
NUAL REPORT, supra note 5, app. at E-38, and the trend over time continues downward.
See Terasaki, supra note 18, at 252 (noting that the average life of a transplanted heart is
seven years). Moreover, the heart itself may have only a fixed number of years of useful
life regardless of the body it happens to inhabit.
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his heart needs the support of an extensive medical establish-
ment to fulfill his death wish. That medical establishment need
not cooperate.1 48
Underlying the second point is a presumption that suicidal
behavior is wrong and that society should do what it can to
prevent the occurrence of suicide. The case law on refusing
medical treatment is very clear in recognizing that the state
does have a strong interest in preventing suicide, particularly
when the person who wants to kill herself is healthy.1 4 9 But
why is that? What justifies interfering with individual auton-
148. Many have argued that the state should allow assistance to those who wish to
take their own lives, particularly when they are suffering from a terminal illness. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Gleicher, Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide, 73 MICH. B.J. 184, 186-87
(1994); Cheryl K. Smith, What About Legalized Assisted Suicide?, 8 IssuES L. & MED.
503 (1993). For the time being, however, it would appear that the state is not required to
allow such assistance no matter what reason the patient has for wanting to die, whether to
end her suffering from a terminal illness or to provide organs for someone else. In Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), the United States Su-
preme Court acknowledged a patient's liberty interest in refusing lifesaving medical treat-
ment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 278-79. How-
ever, the Court also noted that a state has an important interest in preserving human life,
noting with apparent approval the fact that a majority of states have enacted statutes mak-
ing assisted suicide a crime. Id. at 280-81. Thus, while a state may be prohibited from
interfering with the natural dying process, it does not follow that a patient may insist on
receiving assistance to accelerate death. See Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted
Suicide Unconstitutional?, HASTINGS CENTER RaP., May/June 1993, at 32, 34. But see
Tom Stacy, Euthanasia and the Supreme Court's Competing Conceptions of Religious
Liberty, 10 IssuEs L. & MED. 55, 63-64 (1994) (suggesting that the Supreme Court's plu-
rality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S.Ct.
2791 (1992), where the Court described the heart of the liberty interest as "the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning ... and of the mystery of life," provides
a basis for concluding that decisions regarding how a person wishes to end her life are
constitutionally protected). In the only appellate cases directly addressing the issue, two
courts have held that there is no constitutional right to assisted suicide. See Compassion in
Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590-94 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a state of Wash-
ington statute which criminalized the act of providing assistance to suicide did not violate
either the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); Don-
aldson v. Lungren, 4 Cal Rptr. 2d 59, 63-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a patient
suffering from an inoperable brain tumor had no constitutional right to assisted death from
a premortem cryogenic suspension undertaken to preserve his body until an effective treat-
ment for his condition could be developed). See also Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., 518
N.W.2d 487, 492-93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that there is no constitutional right to
commit suicide, "much less the right to assisted suicide"). A claim also could be made
that, to the extent it is religiously motivated, assisted suicide is protected by the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, see supra note 53, but such claims would probably fail
as against the state's compelling interests in preventing homicide and suicide and preserv-
ing the integrity of the medical profession. Accord Smolin, supra note 53, at 49-50.
149. See McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 627 (Nev. 1990) (holding that a com-
petent, adult quadriplegic's right to withdraw artificial life support outweighed the state
interest in preserving life). See also Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 382 (Cal.
1993); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223-23 (N.J. 1985).
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omy in this way? Is it because we believe that most suicide
decisions are not rational, that people who take their own lives
are not competent to make such a decision, either because of
mental illness or the influence of mind-altering substances, and
that without such infirmity, they would not choose this
course? 150  If so, then such a rationale might not justify
preventing suicide by potential organ donors, particularly in
this hypothetical. The desire to protect one's children is not ir-
rational. Parents are responsible for their children's welfare
and are encouraged by society to make many sacrifices in their
personal and professional lives to promote their children's inter-
ests. 51 While most parents might not be willing to give their
lives for their children, some would. In an era of increased con-
cern about parents who do not care enough, we might not nec-
essarily want to discourage such self-sacrificing behavior.152
Perhaps a better rationale for discouraging this type of su-
icide is that a strong stance opposing suicide is necessary to
prevent suicide from becoming ever more prevalent, particu-
larly among those not suffering from mental illness or sub-
stance abuse. A suicide-permissive society sends the message
that suicide may be the reasonable thing to do in certain cir-
cumstances, particularly when the person receiving the message
is no longer a "productive" member of society, whether because
150. The two most common causes of suicide in America are depression and chronic
alcoholism. See George P. Smith, II, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of
Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVis L.
REv. 275, 296 (1988) (citing Richard W. Hudgens, Preventing Suicide, 308 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 897 (1983)).
151. In certain cases, parents (mothers) have been required to undergo physical risks
comparable to those experienced by living kidney donors in order to protect the health of
their unborn children. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274
S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga. 1981) (ordering a Caesarean section for a mother after doctors testi-
fied it was necessary to protect the health of the mother and the unborn baby). The modern
trend, however, has been to defer to the choice of the mother as with all other medical
procedures. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1990). This result seems re-
quired by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), where the Court held that a state
could not require a woman to undergo any medical procedures exposing her to any in-
creased risk in order to protect an unborn fetus. Id. at 768-69.
152. Of course, if the person who wants to sacrifice her life to save another with an
organ transplant is not related to the recipient, one might be more concerned about her
rationality. She could be suffering from mental or emotional illness and could simply be
seeking a socially acceptable, "meaningful" end to her own existence.
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of age, illness, or unemployment.153 It is important for a society
concerned with the welfare of all of its members not to send
messages that encourage some to feel they are not worth hav-
ing around. The question then becomes whether allowing par-
ents or other relatives of a dying patient to sacrifice their lives
to save the patient will encourage those at society's margin to
consider ending their own lives as well. I believe it probably
will. The message of such a policy would be clear - pre-medi-
tated suicide is an appropriate option and citizens should do
their duty, however defined. Such a message would tend to en-
courage people who believe that they do not have much to of-
fer, because of age or health or economic status, to do their
duty, namely to stop being a drain on society and to take their
own life.
For these reasons, we may wish to prohibit organ dona-
tions resulting in the inevitable death of the donor. How much
of a lesser risk should we be willing to accept? Here, we can
legitimately prohibit those transplant procedures having a sub-
stantial likelihood of causing death or significant impairment in
the donor. Death, after all, is not the only adverse result to be
concerned about. If a donor kills herself, at least society does
not have to worry about taking care of that person anymore.
But if a donor only succeeds in significantly impairing her bod-
ily functions, then society must bear the burden of that person's
medical care and reduced productivity. For example, a particu-
lar lung transplant procedure might so impair respiratory func-
tion for the donor that she could no longer work and would
need frequent hospitalizations to treat respiratory infections
and other complications. If such an outcome were reasonably
predictable, the state would be within its rights to prohibit that
procedure.1 54
153. See Kamisar, supra note 148, at 39 (suggesting that suicide could come to be
perceived as reasonable, even noble, in a society that permits the taking of one's own life).
154. One commentator suggests that this is the standard that the courts would in-
deed adopt as the appropriate balancing between the individual donor and state interests,
although without much explanation for his rationale. See Rodney K. Adams, Live Organ
Donors and Informed Consent, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 555, 560 (1987) ("In view of the public
policy favoring organ donation, it is reasonable to conclude that the courts would find a
personal right to donate organs absent substantial risk of permanent impairment."). An-
other writer argues that potentially disabling transplant procedures should be disallowed
because of "society's deplorable track record in caring for the disabled." Apparently as-
suming that additional resources will not be made available in the foreseeable future, the
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Under this standard, the living kidney, liver, and lung
transplant procedures already described would all pass muster.
The serious complication rate for kidney donations is very low,
deaths from donations are rare, and long-term renal function
for persons with one kidney is essentially normal. 155 Prelimi-
nary results from live liver and lung procedures indicate gener-
ally favorable outcomes for donors. 156 As for future living
transplant procedures, their acceptability would have to be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis.
When deciding whether to allow a particular living donor
procedure, we need to remember the many advantages that liv-
ing donors offer over cadaveric ones. First, with living donors
we know we have the consent of the proper parties. We need
not resort to artificial strategies such as presumed consent to
obtain organs when neither the deceased nor the next of kin are
particularly enthusiastic about making those organs available.
Second, with living donors the rewards of organ donation are
experienced by people who can really appreciate them, the do-
nors themselves, and not by people, the next of kin, whose joys
of giving are seriously constrained by the tragedy of coping
with the unexpected loss of someone close to them. Third, liv-
ing donors are plentiful enough that they can meet the need for
many types of organs. Cadaveric donors will probably never
suffice to meet the need, no matter what strategies to increase
donations are employed. Finally, increased reliance on living
donors will reduce the pressures to find other sorts of cadaveric
donors, such as the terminally ill or the incompetent. By show-
ing greater respect for the living, all are enriched.
4. Paying for Organs
If a decision is made to increase the use of living organ
donors, the question will arise whether any restrictions should
be placed on the means of recruiting such donors. Many may
be reluctant to provide organs, particularly to people they
writer argues that creating more disabled people would be "immoral." Lori B. Andrews,
My Body, My Property, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1986, at 28, 32.
155. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
156. In a Japanese study of 34 living liver donors, 59% reported no side effects at
least six months after the donation, 20% reported fatigue, 12% reported wound pain, and
10% reported other symptoms. See Taisuke Morimoto et al., Quality of Life Among Do-
nors of Liver Transplants to Relatives, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 363, 363 (1993).
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neither know nor are related to, because of the risks associated
with donating. If this reluctance is not overcome, many of the
potential advantages of using living donors will not be realized.
One way to do it would be to pay the donors for their organs.
While this approach is currently illegal under federal'57 and
many state158 laws, these laws can obviously be changed. But
should they be?
A preliminary objection that can be made to organ sales
focuses on their potential to create market abuses. We begin by
assuming an unregulated market for organ sales, one in which
organ owners can sell their organs to the highest bidder. Only
the rich organ buyers could play this game. The poor ones
would be priced out of the market and into an early grave.
Moreover, because knowledge of who wants to sell and who
wants to buy might be difficult to come by, organ brokers
would no doubt enter the picture. In an unregulated market,
with desperate buyers and unsophisticated sellers, these brokers
would probably buy very low and sell very high, keeping most
of the profit from this transaction to themselves. 59
Ordinarily, we accept these kinds of results in a capitalis-
tic economy. The market determines who buys and who sells
and who falls by the wayside. However, when issues of life and
death are involved, we no longer rely solely on the market.
Food stamps are given to those who cannot afford to buy their
own food, emergency shelter given to the homeless when the
temperature becomes dangerously cold, emergency medical
care provided to the poor when they have no insurance. More-
157. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1988) (banning the sale
of organs for transplantation).
158. See, e.g., UNIF. ANATOMICAL Giir AcT § 10 (1987), 8A U.L.A. 58 (1993)
(now adopted in 15 states but applicable only to sale of organs and tissues from dead
donors). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-280a(b) (Supp. 1994) (prohibiting payment for
any "human organ" used in transplantation); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10025(a) (1993 &
Supp. 1994) (prohibiting human organ and nonregenerative tissue purchases); VA. CODE
ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (Michie 1994) (prohibiting the sale of any "natural body part").
159. A West German organ broker, for example, is alleged to have purchased kid-
neys from poverty-stricken Turks for $3500 and then resold them to people outside Turkey
for between $26,000 and $52,000. J. Harvey, Paying Organ Donors, 16 J. MED. ETmCS
117, 117 (1990). The federal statute prohibiting organ sales was enacted in response to the
announced plans of a Virginia physician, H. Barry Jacobs, to operate an international kid-
ney brokerage firm in this country. Dr. Jacobs planned to charge between $2000 and $5000
for each healthy kidney and to recruit donors from developing countries. See Margaret
Engel, Virginia Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human Kidneys, WASH. POST,
Sept. 19, 1983, at A9.
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over, a free market in the healthcare field has not existed for a
long time. Most Americans do not pay directly for their health
care, but instead have it provided for them by their health in-
surance, either from the public (Medicare or Medicaid) or the
private sector (usually through their employer).160 In addition,
there have been recent efforts at both federal and state levels to
provide health insurance to those who are still without it.' 61
Most health insurance programs, whether public or private,
currently cover the cost of most solid organ transplants.162
However, these insurers are not about to accept a system in
which large, unregulated amounts of money are being paid for,
and large, unregulated profits being made from, organ sales
when the insurance companies would be expected to reimburse
the payments. Accordingly, any system of payment for organs
will be administered by the insurers and will be tightly regu-
lated to eliminate middleperson profits and to pay the mini-
mum amounts necessary to generate the needed organs. Trans-
actions outside the system will not be tolerated.
Should such a system be acceptable? Most proposals for
organ sales made in recent years have been limited to sales of
cadaver organs.'63 This limit reflects, I believe, a concern that
organ sales by the living may result in unacceptable exploita-
160. As of 1991, 150.5 million Americans were covered by health insurance through
their employment, four million purchased their own primary health insurance, 27 million
were covered by Medicaid (for the poor), and 34 million were covered by Medicare (for the
elderly), meaning that 86.6% of the entire population was covered by some form of insur-
ance. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 98, at 112, 115. The number of uninsured has
grown in the last three years.
161. See, e.g., Robin Toner, The Health Care Debate: News Analysis, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 1994, at Al; Robert Pear, States Again Try Health Changes as Congress Fails,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994, at Al.
162. See 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27, at IV-8 to IV-10; CONGRESSIONAL
RESOURCE SERVICE, MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS 292-94
(1993).
163. See, e.g., A.H. Barnett & David L. Kaserman, The Shortage of Organs for
Transplantation: Exploring the Alternatives, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 117, 125 (1993); Roger
D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, The Economics and Ethics of Alternative Cadaveric Or-
gan Procurement Policies, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 403, 407 (1991); James F. Blumstein, The
Use of Financial Incentives in Medical Care: The Case of Commerce in Transplantable
Organs, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 24, 29 (1993); Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of
Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 30
(1989); Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 57 (1989); Richard Schwindt & Ardan R. Vining, Propo-
sal for a Future Delivery Market for Transplant Organs, 11 J. HEALTH POL, POL'Y &
LAW 483 (1986); Stephen J. Spurr, The Shortage of Transplantable Organs: An Analysis
and a Proposal, 15 LAW & POLICY 355, 373 (1993).
[Vol. 5:249
THE FUTURE OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
tion of the poor. 6 4 Even those who advocate sales by living do-
nors16 5 sometimes express concerns about the need to avoid ex-
ploitation, such as by preventing sales by those who are
"financially vulnerable," that is, persons who want to sell their
organs only because they need the money.' 6 Is exploitation a
legitimate reason to prohibit living organ sales?
It is, of course, a truism that many of us engage in what
are otherwise objectionable activities simply because we need
the money: collecting garbage, making chemicals, working on
an assembly line, flipping burgers, selling insurance, fixing
roofs, doing secretarial work. These occupations can be alter-
nately unpleasant and/or dangerous, yet they are an estab-
lished part of our economic life and not generally considered
beyond the pale in terms of worker exploitation (assuming they
comply with minimum wage, safety, and other employee wel-
fare regulations) ,167 So how is selling body parts to make
money any different?
The first difference is that in the normal employment situ-
ation, one's body (one's labor) is only for rent, not for sale. Of
164. As one advocate of cadaveric organ markets states, "[B]y only harvesting or-
gans from the dead, exploitation of the poor is precluded. For in the cadaver market the
vendors are neither rich nor poor, merely dead. No one will be forced by the desperation of
poverty to sacrifice their dignity or health, or undergo great suffering." Cohen, supra note
163, at 30. Lori Andrews, an early advocate of living donor organ sales, see supra note
154, has since acknowledged this potential for exploitation and even has suggested that
organ sales might appropriately be delayed until the donor's death. See Lori Andrews et
al., Sacred or for Sale?, HARPER'S MAG., Oct. 1990, at 47, 50 ("I understand the potential
for exploitation and I think you can circumvent it by allowing sale upon death so that
nobody's paid during his or her life.") (statement by Ms. Andrews). See also id. at 51
(discussing the possibility of the poor being exploited for their organs).
165. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 154, at 32; Harvey, supra note 159, at 118;
Lantos & Siegler, supra note 9, at 271.
166. See Harvey, supra note 159, at 118 (arguing for limits on organ sales by the
poor to prevent exploitation).
167. Economists even use wage differentials between jobs having similar skill re-
quirements but different risk exposures to calculate the value of a human life. For example,
assume that a welder on an automobile assembly line earns an annual salary of $30,000
but has a 1 in 10,000 annual risk of being killed in an on-the-job accident, while a welder
for a high-rise construction project earns $35,000 but has an 11 in 10,000 chance of being
killed. The high-rise welder earns an extra $5000 but his chances of being killed in any
given year are I in 1000 (10 in 10,000) greater. That means we have to pay him $5000 to
agree to accept this extra risk of death. If we multiply $5000 times 1000, then we know
what we would have to pay him if the job was definitely going to kill him that year (that is,
if the chances were I in 1), or $5,000,000. That is how much a life is worth. See generally
W. Kip Viseusi, Strategic and Ethical Issues in the Valuation of Life, in RIcHARD J.
ZECKHAUSER, STRATEGY AND CHOICE (1991). Makes you wonder about economists, does it
not?
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course, it is neither uncommon nor illegal1 68 for people to sell
certain body parts already, such as blood, sperm, ova, and hair.
These tissues, however, can be distinguished from solid organs
because they are easily obtained from the donor'6 9 and are ei-
ther easily replenished or (in the case of ova) easily done with-
out. When the burden of donation is this light, perhaps we need
not be concerned about exploitation.
Matters are somewhat more complicated for solid organ
sales, however. The level of bodily intrusion of the donor is
much greater, the recovery time much longer, the risk of long-
term complications much higher. What kind of person would
willingly, without coercion, agree to sell an organ under these
circumstances? We have an intuitive sense that something
must be wrong here. People who did not need the money badly
would not bother to sell the organs. Either they would have a
close enough personal attachment to the organ recipient that
they would give the organ away, or they would not be inter-
ested in providing an organ under any circumstances, even if
offered payment. If the only reason people are selling their or-
gans is because they really need the money, are we not exploit-
ing their financial distress to get them to mutilate their bod-
ies?170 And is that not what we are worried about?17 1
168. The National Organ Transplant Act defines those human tissues (actually
"human organs") that cannot be sold as "human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart,
lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone and skin and any subpart thereof" as well
as any tissues specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 42 U.S.C.
§ 274e(c)(1) (1988). No additional tissues have been so specified by the Secretary. Accord-
ingly, blood, sperm, ova, and hair are not covered. State law prohibitions have similar ex-
ceptions. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-280a(a)(2) (Supp. 1994) (excluding hair,
blood, and blood components); 35 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 10025(c) (1993 & Supp. 1994) (ex-
cluding blood, sperm, and other readily renewable tissues); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1
(Michie 1994) (excluding hair, ova, blood, and "other self-replicating body fluids").
169. Ova may present a special case deserving of special treatment. Donating ova is
significantly more difficult and potentially more hazardous than donating blood, sperm, or
hair. Donors are injected with hormones to stimulate production of ova. These injections
can cause ovarian cysts. The ova are then removed under anesthesia in a procedure that
can cause bleeding, infection, and possible fertility problems. See ANDREW KimBRELL, THE
HUMAN BODY SHOP 83-84 (1993). Ova donors can receive $2000 per donation compared
with $50 per donation for sperm donors. Id. at 77, 84. No doubt the difference reflects the
relative difficulty of donation.
170. Realize, of course, that if we do not allow people to sell their organs just be-
cause they are desperate for money, we are not necessarily doing them any favors. As
Margaret Radin has stated, "[I]f we think respect for persons warrants prohibiting a
mother from selling something personal [like an organ] to obtain food for her starving
children, we do not respect her personhood more by forcing her to let them starve instead."
Margaret J. Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1910-11 (1987). We
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There is another reason to oppose organ sales. Changing to
a paid system could have a devastating effect on an important
altruistic institution in our society.' Today's system of organ
and tissue donation is primarily a voluntary one. As such, it
plays an important role in the integration of a society increas-
ingly estranged from itself. Most organ and tissue donation to-
day is done anonymously, either in the form of blood and bone
marrow from living donors, or in the form of organ donations
from the deceased.' 73 These donations allow individuals to show
care and concern for fellow citizens who are unknown to them,
and thereby strengthen the ties that bind our society to-
gether.' -4 Organ donations are an important part of the volun-
tary contributions we make as citizens to help improve our
community. If money enters the picture, the element of com-
munity is lost. We are no longer giving of ourselves to help
those in need of the most basic of human resources.
Money also cheapens the value of donated tissue and or-
gans. What once was a gift of immeasurable generosity be-
comes just one more transaction in today's overloaded market-
place. It loses its special nature and becomes just one more
commodity. The presence of money can even act to diminish
the worth of the donor. I am reminded of an incident in my
high school chemistry class. I can still hear my teacher's voice
must assume (as we work for) a society which provides the basics - food, shelter, clothing
- so that avoidance of certain market transactions does not have such stark consequences.
171. Surrogate motherhood provides another example of society's continuing diffi-
culty with permitting potential exploitation of the physical human body. In surrogacy ar-
rangements, a woman (the surrogate) agrees to gestate a fetus and give up the resulting
baby for adoption to another couple. The genetic father of the baby is usually the adoptive
father. The genetic mother is normally the surrogate (who is artificially inseminated) but
also can be the adoptive mother or even an anonymous fourth party. Surrogates usually
receive payment for their services. Even though surrogates only rent a body part, instead of
selling it, and even though the rental is only for nine months, concerns about possible ex-
ploitation (as well as fears of baby selling and damage to the child's psyche) have caused
11 states to ban surrogacy arrangements, either by statute or court decision. See Keith J.
Hey, Assisted Conception and Surrogacy - Unfinished Business, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REv.
775, 799-800 (1993). Only three states have expressly legalized surrogacy arrangements.
Id. See also Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784-85 (Cal. 1993) (rejecting the notion
that surrogacy contracts tend to exploit women).
172. For the original exposition of this argument, see Anderson, supra note 13, at
493-94.
173. Most of the arguments against organ sales that I have made to this point relate
primarily to sales by living donors. This argument, however, regarding the adverse effects
on altruism, applies with equal strength to both living and cadaveric sales.
174. See RICHARD M. TrTMUss, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO
SOCIAL POLICY 225-26 (1971) (describing the policies underlying blood donation).
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as he announced that each member of the class was worth
about $2.00, or the current market value of the chemical ele-
ments that made up the molecules in our bodies. While we all
pretended to laugh, I remember feeling very uncomfortable
with the idea of somebody else putting a price on my body.
Wholesale commodification of human body parts does much
the same thing, and in the process comes a lot closer to making
a more "realistic" market valuation - kidneys at $5000 each,
livers $10,000, hearts $15,000 and so forth. Add them all up,
and you know the value of a person.
Furthermore, if money is introduced to the system, it may
cause a domino effect 17 6 that does away with most altruistic
transactions in organs. Economic theory suggests that, in the
presence of complete information, only one price can exist for
any product. This theory implies that a product, like organs,
cannot simultaneously be available for free and for some higher
amount. 177 Accordingly, once it becomes common knowledge
that organs are for sale, it will probably drive altruistic donors
out of the market, or, alternatively, turn them into organ sell-
ers. Why should they give away for free that for which others
are getting paid?17 8 The only exception will be unpaid donors
who have unusual "utility functions"'7' that would motivate
them to provide their organs at less than market value. Such
utility functions no doubt exist for donors in intrafamilial
transactions, where the continued existence of a family member
has a more intense value to the donor than if she did not know
her recipient.
This consequence is a classic example of how the rules we
adopt do not simply reflect the natural tendencies of people but
can also be instrumental in directing their conduct toward the
more desirable of several possible outcomes. 80 To the extent
175. As one author states, "[I]f we come to think about ourselves as pork bellies,
pork bellies we will become." Leon R. Kass, Organs for Sale? 107 PUB. INTEREST 65, 83
(1992).
176. For a description of this domino effect, see Radin, supra note 170, at 1907-08.
177. See Reuben A. Kessel, Transfused Blood, Serum Hepatitis and the Coase The-
orem, 17 J. L. & ECON. 265, 286 n.68 (1974) (explaining the underlying market theory
against commercialization of organ harvesting).
178. Some critics suggest that this is indeed the fear of those espousing the altruistic
approach. See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 163, at 27.
179. See Kessel, supra note 177, at 286 n.68.
180. See, e.g., Baron, supra note 113, at 176-77.
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that society believes altruism is important for a healthy com-
munity, it should encourage altruism by discouraging the phe-
nomenon of paid donors.
The argument for paying donors is strongest when there
are no other options for dying patients. In India, for example,
there is no money to provide dialysis for patients with kidney
failure, and there is no infrastructure to remove and preserve
cadaveric kidneys and match them with potential recipients. In
addition, potential donors live in grinding poverty with little
hope for relief from their condition.181 Under these circum-
stances, the widespread practice of paying living donors for kid-
neys might be justifiable. However, when dialysis is available
for all who need it, when a cadaveric transplant system is
highly developed, and when the government has the resources
to assure a minimally adequate standard of living for all of its
people, the exploitative aspects of paying for donations are
much harder to accept. Admittedly, dialysis-type options do not
exist for those in need of liver or lung transplants, but we can
do more to encourage other methods of donating. The downside
of commodifying vital human organs is simply too much to ac-
cept without first exploring all other possible options. 82
181. See Charles P. Wallace, For Sale: The Poor's Body Parts, L.A. TiMm, Aug. 27,
1992, at Al (describing the current situation in India but also noting that no permanent
change appears to occur in the economic status of people who sell their organs).
182. Some advocates of organ sales point to the prominent role money plays in other
aspects of the organ donation process - payments to doctors who perform the transplant
operations, to hospitals where transplants are performed, to drug companies who provide
anti-rejection medications - and ask why the donor should be the only one not to benefit
financially from the transplant procedure. See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 163, at 23. The
short answer is that the organ donor's role is unique. Physicians, hospitals, and pharmaceu-
tical companies provide transplant services and products to hundreds of different patients.
This is their livelihood. If they did not get paid for their work, they could not survive. The
solid organ donor only donates once. This is not her business, this is not her livelihood.
Payment is neither necessary nor desirable.
Adoption is another area where we allow the peripheral players in the process to be
paid but not the person who provides the essential product. When a mother decides to place
her child for adoption, we fully expect the social workers, the lawyers, and the placement
agencies who facilitate the process to be paid for their efforts. But the mother gets nothing
as compensation for her child. The most she can recover is reimbursement for her medical
expenses while pregnant, just as the organ donor's medical expenses are picked up by the
organ recipient. Even in surrogate motherhood situations, see supra note 171, if the surro-
gate gets paid, her contract makes clear that the payment is for her services in carrying the
baby and not for the baby itself.
19951
HEALTH MATRIX
III. THE ALLOCATION PROBLEM
No matter what kinds of changes we make to the organ
procurement system to increase organ supply, an organ
shortage will probably continue for some time. New programs
will not be adopted overnight, and even when they are in place,
for some organs, particularly hearts, sufficient replacement or-
gans will likely never be available.18 While a shortage persists,
we must decide how to allocate those organs that are available.
Under the current system of organ allocation, patients are
placed on waiting lists for organ transplants according to crite-
ria developed by local transplant teams. 184 Once on a waiting
list, patients are selected to receive transplants according to cri-
teria developed by the United Network for Organ Sharing
(UNOS), the private organization selected by the federal gov-
ernment to coordinate organ transplantation decisions in this
country. 185 Hospitals with transplant programs must abide by
UNOS rules or lose their Medicare and Medicaid funding. 8 6
Changes in the criteria used either to place patients on the
waiting list or to select them for transplants from that list are
183. Work continues on development of an artificial heart as well as transplants from
animals. See supra notes 22 and 26.
184. See Developments in the Law: Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARv. L.
REv. 1519, 1630-31 (1990). Factors determining eligibility for placement on the list are
age (usually no more than 55), whether the patient will comply with medical regime of
therapy and medication (family support, education level, and occupation), patient's condi-
tion (bad, but not too bad), and availability of alternative treatments. See supra Spurr,
note 163, at 358. Obviously a great deal of subjectivity exists in these judgments. This
subjectivity creates the opportunity for abuse, favoritism, and unequal treatment based on
class, race, or other prejudice. See, e.g., Ian Ayres et al., Unequal Racial Access to Kidney
Transplantation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 805, 807 n.6 (1993). A recent study of people on dialy-
sis indicates that, even after controlling for contraindicated medical conditions, women,
non-Whites, and those with low incomes are much less likely to receive a kidney transplant.
See Daniel S. Gaylin et al., The Impact of Comorbid and Sociodemographic Factors on
Access to Renal Transplantation, 269 JAMA 603, 603 (1993). Because candidates for
organ transplants are drawn from waiting lists according to uniform, non-discriminatory
UNOS policies, see infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text, this disparity must be
caused primarily by discrimination in the decision to place people on the waiting list in the
first place. But see Ayres et al., supra, at 807 (demonstrating that even facially neutral
selection criteria may result in fewer African-Americans being chosen from the waiting
lists owing to incompatible tissue types). The discretionary nature of the wait listing pro-
cess is the only way that Mr. Casey's status as governor of Pennsylvania helped him get
favorable treatment in the transplant process. He was able to meet on short notice with the
leading liver transplant surgeon in the world and be placed on a waiting list almost imme-
diately. Most people do not receive that kind of service.
185. For a brief history of the UNOS program, see Ayres et al., supra note 184, at
813-14 (1993).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8(a)(1)(B) (1988).
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needed to avoid some of the undesirable results that occur
under the current system. Considerations of utility should be
paramount because the resource is limited. Assuming, as we
must,1 87 that all human beings are of equal value, we should be
using the organs that are available to minimize the total num-
ber of deaths. When all cannot be saved (thousands currently
die each year while waiting), we should still seek to lose as few
as possible. As an initial matter, then, the logic of this argu-
ment requires an end to all multiple organ transplants. When a
heart and liver become available from one donor for transplant,
they should be used to save two lives (one needing only a heart,
the other needing only a liver) and not just one. Accordingly,
transplant operations like that which saved Governor Casey's
life should no longer be performed. While it may seem callous
to condemn someone in the governor's position to a certain
death, it seems less so when we recognize that saving his life
caused two others to die.
Besides outlawing multiple organ transplants, utility con-
siderations also would suggest a reversal of priorities with re-
spect to the condition of the recipient at the time of transplant.
For purposes of evaluating transplant success, patients awaiting
transplants are classified according to the seriousness of their
current condition, ranging from Class One (working or attend-
ing school full time) to Class Six (on life support). Generally
speaking, patients who are the sickest have first priority for or-
gans, based on the theory that the healthier patients can afford
to wait longer for their turn.1 88 The problem with this ap-
proach, however, is that the success rate for patients in Class
Six is markedly worse than for those in higher categories. To
give just one example: The one-year success rate for all liver
transplants performed in the five-year period ending December
31, 1991 for patients in Class Six was 47.5%, compared with
79.1 % for those in Class One.18 9 Notwithstanding the lower
187. For a discussion of why making comparisons between the value of different peo-
pie is inadvisable, see infra text accompanying notes 205-06.
188. See UNOS POLICIES, supra note 6, at 3-15 to 3-17 (livers) and 3-20 to 3-21
(hearts).
189. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 130, app. at E-12. For heart transplants,
72% of the Class Six transplants lasted one year, compared with 93% of the Class One
transplants. Id., app. at E-20.
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rate of success, 1971 liver transplants were done for Class Six
patients, compared with only 463 for Class One.19
There is a reason that the current system of favoring the
sickest patients for transplantation was adopted. We find it ex-
ceedingly difficult to ignore the plight of the dying patient, and
our instinct is to do whatever we can to save her. That is why
we also allow multiple organ transplants (as well as repeat
transplants for the same patient). 191 In so doing, however, we
are pursuing the classical fallacy of favoring the identified life
at the expense of the statistical life.192 This tendency means
investing resources to save a person whose plight has already
been brought to our attention as opposed to saving the person
whose problem is just as real but whose condition has not yet
become known to us.
There is nothing wrong with following one's emotions and
rescuing the person most obviously in need of help, provided
that doing so produces overall results at least as beneficial as
those which would have been produced had one chosen to help
the other (statistical) life. But frequently it does not, wherein
lies the fallacy. So, for example, we may expend tens of
thousands of dollars and many days of labor to save the life of
a little child trapped in a well, but we do not expend similar
amounts of resources for vaccinations that would save five chil-
dren (as yet unidentified) from death by contagious disease.
The same unfortunate result seems to be happening in the liver
transplant program, which spends several hundred thousand
dollars on a liver transplant for a critically ill person. But in so
doing, it may be sacrificing the life of some other person, not
yet identified and not yet on death's door, who also needs a
transplant, and who would have had a much better prognosis
had she received this one. When this same person becomes
deathly ill, the system may show the same level of concern for
her as it did for her predecessor. But now it may not be able to
find an organ in time, and even if it does, her chances for long-
term survival will not be nearly as good as they would have
been if she had received the transplant at the earlier date. In a
190. Id., app. at E-12.
191. See text at notes 194-96 infra.
192. For a discussion of the difference between statistical lives and identifiable lives
and society's willingness to protect each, see BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 633 (2d ed. 1991).
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period of shortage, it is inevitable that some will not receive
organs. But society has an obligation to ensure that those or-
gans transplanted will save as many lives as possible. That obli-
gation means providing them not to the sickest people, but to
the people who will be most likely to benefit.
Utilitarian concerns are not the only ones present, how-
ever. There is also a question of distributive justice. If each
person is of equal value, then each person who needs a trans-
plant should be able to make a claim for an equal chance at
receiving one. However, if we were to adopt such an approach
exclusively, it would not leave any room for the utilitarian con-
cerns already discussed.1 93 I believe that utilitarian concerns
clearly should play a paramount role in order to assure the sur-
vival of the greatest number of people. Nevertheless, I also be-
lieve there is still a role for distributive justice to play once all
other things are equal, that is, when the candidates for an or-
gan transplant have similar chances for survival. When this is
true, considerations of fairness require that repeat transplanta-
tions for the same person not be allowed. Repeat transplanta-
tions occur after an original transplant is rejected by the recipi-
ent. When rejection occurs, it is common practice to undertake
a second (and sometimes third) transplant operation for the
same patient.194
Some have argued that retransplantation should not be
done because retransplants have a higher failure rate than orig-
inal transplants.1 95 But I would argue that they should be pro-
hibited even if the success rate were the same or better. 96 So
long as there are not enough organs to go around, fundamental
fairness requires that each person be given only one opportu-
nity at an organ transplant. 197 This principle is particularly
193. As commentator Dan Brock has put it, "The fundamental ethical conflict in the
distribution of scarce organs is between doing the most good with a scarce resource and
ensuring that it is distributed fairly." Dan W. Brock, Ethical Issues in Recipient Selection
for Organ Transplantation, in ORGAN SUBsrTUTON TECHNOLOGY 86, 87 (Deborah Ma-
thieu ed., 1988).
194. Peter Ubel et al., Rationing Failure: The Ethical Lessons of the Retransplanta-
tion of Scarce Vital Organs, 270 JAMA 2469, 2469-70 (1993) (analyzing the efficacy and
underlying rationale of retransplantation).
195. Id. at 2473.
196. For a similar argument, see Brock, supra note 193, at 99.
197. I would make an exception for retransplants when the organs are from family
members. In the case of living donations, when a donated kidney from one family member
fails, it is fairly common for someone else in the family to provide a second kidney. This
1995]
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true for heart, liver, and lung transplants, when the only alter-
native to transplantation is death. For some to have second or
third chances before others have had even one simply cannot be
justified.198
second donation would not be made if the organ could not be kept within the family. Any
attempt to prevent this kind of familial preference would be cruel and counterproductive.
Directed donations raise interesting issues in other contexts as well. In the case of
deceased donors, the current version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act allows the donor,
or his family, to designate the recipient of the donor's organs. See UNiF. ANATOMICAL GIFT
AcT, § 6 (1987), 8A U.L.A. 53 (1993). While most donors and their families are not
aware of this right of directed donation, a few have attempted to use it to require that
organs be used only for people of a certain race or ethnic ancestry. See, e.g., Jeff Tes-
terman, Should Donors Say Who Gets Organs?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Jan. 9, 1994, at
1A (describing the family of Ku Klux Klan sympathizer who successfully restricted the
donation of their son's organs to Caucasians only). Organ procurement agencies are faced
with a difficult decision in these cases. While not wanting to lend support to racist ideas,
they know that refusing any organ donation, for whatever reason, will cause additional
deaths. One can rationalize accepting racist restrictions on the grounds that the use of
these organs will remove some people from the waiting list and thereby make it easier for
members of non-favored groups to obtain the next organs becoming available. On the other
hand, accepting racist restrictions may cause so much damage to the social fabric as to
make the gains in lives saved not worth the cost.
A question also arises as to whether these restrictions violate the civil rights laws. Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color, or
place of origin in the provision of benefits from "any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). While hospitals are generally subject to
the requirements of Title VI because they receive Medicare and Medicaid funds, see, e.g.,
United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 736 F.2d 1039, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1984), there
is some doubt whether the racial discrimination of the donor's family in limiting potential
recipients can be attributed to the transplant hospital. Cf. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n,
476 U.S. 610, 610 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding that a hospital's refusal to operate
on a newborn baby with Down's syndrome did not violate § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
prohibiting discrimination based on disability because the refusal was based on lack of
parental consent).
198. But see Ubel et al., supra note 194, at 2471. Ubel, Arnold, and Caplan contend
that fairness arguments should not give patients awaiting a first transplant priority over
those seeking a retransplant (assuming that both operations offer similar chances for suc-
cess). According to Ubel, these types of arguments may have "an intuitive appeal" but
they focus too narrowly. Instead of considering access to transplant organs only, Ubel and
company think we should look at access to the entire medical delivery system and even
access to social goods that can affect health, like income and education, when deciding who
most deserves the available organs. Because the patient who needs the initial transplant
may have received preferential treatment with respect to other health care services in the
past, it may be that the retransplant patient is still far enough behind in the overall health
accounting that she deserves first crack at the second organ in order to redress the imbal-
ance. Accordingly, fairness does not automatically require that retransplants have a sec-
ondary priority. Id.
I have two responses. First, as we have already seen, people who get on waiting lists
for organs in the first place tend to be people who have greater access to power and re-
sources. Among the criteria used to choose transplant patients are whether the patient has
adequate family support, education, and occupational experience to comply with a demand-
ing treatment regime. See supra note 184. Moreover, all of the criteria currently used for
choosing transplant candidates result in disproportionate exclusion of non-White, female,
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One could argue that patients who receive an initial trans-
planted organ have made an emotional and psychological com-
mitment to the transplantation process entitling them to prior-
ity access to organs should a retransplant become necessary. In
a sense, they have developed a kind of expectancy interest in
not being abandoned by the medical system should they experi-
ence difficulty with their initial organ. Once on board, they
should be able to remain for the whole voyage. A rescue begun,
but cut short, is more cruel than no rescue at all.
I cannot agree. There is no logical stopping point for this
argument. If a second transplant fails, why not a third and a
fourth and so on. Can we really justify that lavish an expendi-
ture of scarce lifesaving resources on one person? Moreover,
this argument fails to recognize the equally powerful emotional
commitment made to the transplantation process by those left
on the waiting list. Often, this is their only chance at continued
life. The simple act of placing them on the list has created a
powerful expectancy for them that a replacement organ will be
forthcoming. Each day without an organ, their condition weak-
ens, their prospects dim. Why are their hopes for life extension
any less intense, any less deserving of protection than those of
the person who has already received a transplant? Why should
they not have at least one chance of rescue, too? If some are
still concerned about the potential for creation of a special ex-
pectancy interest in retransplantation, we could make it clear
up front that each patient will receive only one organ while
others are still waiting for their first.
Principles of fairness also can be used to assure that each
transplant candidate has an equal opportunity to enjoy long
life. This requires an explicit recognition of the importance of
age. Where resource supply is not limited, it is appropriate to
make technologies available to all patients who can benefit
and poor patients. Id. Accordingly, people who do get onto a waiting list are likely to be
similar in socioeconomic characteristics, and, therefore, in previous access to health
services.
Second, unlike other situations, the choices involved in organ allocation involve life
and death, and as such, justify a separate decision-making process independent of other
considerations. When someone's life is on the line, she deserves an equal opportunity to hit
the jackpot of extended life with other similarly situated people, no matter what has gone
before.
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from them, regardless of age.19  When dialysis machines were
in scarce supply, only 7 % of dialysis patients were age fifty-five
or older.200 Six years after dialysis became universally available
under the Social Security Amendments of 1972, the percentage
of dialysis patients fifty-five and older had reached 46 % .2o
Where supply cannot be increased to meet demand, as
with organ transplants, decisions have to be made about who
lives and who dies. Those who have lived longest should give
way to those who have not. All other things being equal, some-
one who has already lived for sixty years would seem to have
less claim to a new heart promising another ten years of life
than a patient who is only thirty years old. 02 Current trans-
plant practices would appear to reflect this reality. Fewer than
5 % of all organ recipients are 65 or over.203 While UNOS does
not consider age in its allocation decisions, the treating physi-
cians who decide which of their patients will be placed on or-
gan waiting lists obviously do. 0 4 While some no doubt use age
as a proxy for medical suitability, others no doubt use it as a
measure of desert. This policy should be continued.
Finally, I would not, as a general matter, advocate allocat-
ing organs based on the social worth of potential recipients. I
would not try to decide whether it is more appropriate to save
the rocket scientist or the unemployed welder. While it might
seem to make utilitarian sense to save the lives of only the most
worthy citizens, others have already pointed out the difficulty
199. More and more medical resources are being made available to older Americans
in situations where they had previously been denied. Coronary bypass surgery, for example,
was once reserved for the younger patients. People over 80 almost never received the sur-
gery. Today, at many hospitals, between 10 and 25 % of bypass patients are over the age of
80. See Heart Surgery Found to Help People Over 80, Cm. TRm., Mar. 17, 1994, at N4.
200. Roger Evans et al., Implications for Health Care Policy: A Social and Demo-
graphic Profile of Hemodialysis Patients in the United States, 245 JAMA 487, 489
(1981).
201. Id.
202. As to priorities between the older and the very young, some might argue that
the very young have not earned, either by societal contribution or life experience, the right
to claim an organ at the expense of older persons. However, a conflict between these two
age groups will never develop for practical reasons. Adult-size organs that would be suita-
ble for transplantation into a 60 year-old patient would never fit in a young child's body.
203. See 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, app. at D-6, D-10, D-15, D-22.
204. See Spurr, supra note 163, at 358. If physicians did not consider age when
placing people on the waiting list, a higher percentage of older persons would receive trans-
plants, particularly when their increased age makes them much more likely to experience
major organ disease.
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of making the necessary choices.2"5 What attributes should we
(do we) value most highly - science or philosophy, art or
economy, poetry or accountancy? Should we focus on past con-
tributions, which are easier to measure, or future potential,
which is more important to societal welfare? At the extremes
(choosing to save the President of the United States, instead of
a mass murderer), the decisions may appear relatively easy, but
in the vast majority of cases, it would be impossible to reach
consensus and impossible to justify whatever decisions were
made. o6
The only exception should be for those patients who, be-
cause of their conduct, have already been adjudged less worthy
by the society at large. Accordingly, all those convicted of seri-
ous criminal offenses should automatically forfeit their ability
to receive a transplant. There is room for debate on the nature
of the offense that would be serious enough to warrant this pen-
alty (all felonies, only violent felonies, only repeat felons) and
the duration of the ban (lifetime, a fixed period, while the
criminal is incarcerated). But the basic principle remains the
same: when deciding eligibility for transplants, the relative
worth of the various candidates will ordinarily neither be calcu-
lated nor considered. However, a conviction for committing cer-
tain criminal acts will remove a potential participant from con-
sideration altogether for an appropriate period of time.
IV. CONCLUSION
Desperate times lead to desperate measures, but they are
not always good ones. A review of the organ transplantation
system in this country has shown an effort to change many of
the rules of the transplant game, often in ways not for the bet-
ter. Any changes that we make must continue to provide assur-
ance to both prospective organ donor patients and their families
that every effort is being made to manage the patients' care for
their benefit and not for the benefit of other desperately ill pa-
205. See, e.g., Maxwell J. Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical
Treatments, 1985 WIsc. L. REv. 239, 257-58 (1985).
206. Id. Consider the example of the Seattle Artificial Kidney Center in the 1960s,
which, in deciding which patients should be allowed to use the limited number of dialysis
machines available, considered such factors as marital status, past performance, future po-
tential, net worth, occupation, and references. See id. at 256 (citing Shana Alexander,
They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies, 53 Lna 102-04 (Nov. 9, 1962)).
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tients who need new organs. When potential organ donors die,
we also must continue to show at least as much respect for the
families who are left behind as we did for the patients while
they were still alive. This respect means that presumed consent
laws and laws changing the requirements for cadaveric dona-
tions should not be supported.
Moreover, because the number of eligible cadaveric donors
will continue (we hope) to decrease as a result of improved so-
cietal efforts to reduce accidental and violent deaths, we must
look increasingly toward living donors to pick up the slack. The
availability of living donors is an opportunity and not a prob-
lem. With living donors we can get real consent from the
proper parties without resorting to devious stratagems. Living
donors can experience all the joys of donation unmixed by the
tragedy of unexpected death accompanying cadaveric dona-
tions. Enough potential living donors exist to meet much of the
potential demand. In our efforts to produce more and more or-
gans, however, we must not give in to temptation and begin
paying organ donors. Payment brings into question the validity
of consent and raises the specter of exploitation of the poor
through self-mutilation to benefit the more well-to-do. It also
threatens to undermine what has been an important altruistic
institution that has helped to bring together an increasingly
fragmented community. Not everything should be for sale.
Finally, we must make sensible decisions about allocating
those organs that are available. Multiple organ transplants, re-
peat transplants, and transplants to critically ill patients who
will probably die with or without a transplant must be avoided.
With the possible exception of convicted felons, we must not
attempt to allocate organs based on the social worth of the po-
tential recipient. With these principles in mind, the organ
transplantation system could be transformed into one that re-
spects the dignity of all participants, produces more trans-
plants, treats all candidates fairly, fosters a greater spirit of
community, and saves more lives.
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